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GENDER AND THE SHARING ECONOMY 
Naomi Schoenbaum* 
ABSTRACT 
While the sharing economy has been celebrated as a flexible 
alternative to traditional employment for those with family 
responsibilities, especially women, it presents challenges for gender 
equality.  Many of the services that are “shared” take place in the 
context of intimacy, which can have substantial consequences for 
transacting, particularly by enhancing the importance of identity of 
both the worker and the customer.  Expanding on previous research 
on intimate work—a critical area that exists largely in limbo between 
the law of the market and the law of the family—this Article explores 
the significance of intimacy in the sharing economy and the 
implications for regulation of the sharing economy and for sex 
equality.  It argues that the intimacy of many sharing-economy 
transactions heightens the salience of sex to these transactions, in 
tension with sex discrimination law’s goal of reducing the salience of 
sex in the labor market.  But even if existing sex discrimination law 
extends to these transactions, the intimacy of the transactions again 
limits the law’s ability to promote gender equality in the same 
transformative way that it has in the traditional economy.  The 
sharing economy thus raises serious concerns for proponents of sex 
equality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The sharing economy has been hailed as a job creator and 
celebrated for offering flexibility that can benefit all workers, but 
especially women.1  Much of the language used to describe the 
possibilities of the sharing economy for workers is that of liberation 
from the confines of the traditional workaday world and freedom to 
create one’s own productive experience, which might be particularly 
important to women workers, who have historically been 
shortchanged when it comes to the rewards of work.2  Specifically, the 
idea that work can be done largely outside of a standard workplace, 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Natasha Singer, In the Sharing Economy, Workers Find Both Freedom 
and Uncertainty, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
2014/08/17/technology/in-the-sharing-economy-workers-find-both-freedom-and-
uncertainty.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5SL9-EZRK]. 
 2. Id.; see also Paul Merrion, Making Inroads: Women Cabbies on the Rise, 
CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Sept. 27, 2014), http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/
20140927/ISSUE01/309279976/making-inroads-women-cabbies-on-the-rise 
[https://perma.cc/3W77-B973]. 
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and often at home (either the worker’s or the customer’s), and be fit 
into small parcels of a worker’s time, has been seen to be a 
particularly good fit for workers with significant family care 
responsibilities, who are overwhelmingly women.3  The sharing 
economy’s merging of home and work harkens back to an earlier era 
when women were less likely to labor in a formal workplace, and 
more likely to work from their own or someone else’s home.4  Even 
the term “sharing” suggests the traditionally feminine value of 
cooperation over the traditionally masculine value of competition.5  
In light of this seeming synergy between women workers and the 
sharing economy, is the sharing economy in fact a boon to women’s 
equality?6 
                                                                                                                 
 3. Singer, supra note 1. 
 4. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 51, 54 (1997) (describing how at the turn of the nineteenth to twentieth 
century, “[k]eeping boarders was a lucrative source of income for women,” and how 
women at this time “engaged in industrial home work, doing paid piecework in their 
homes, such as sewing garments, typing documents, or rolling cigars”). 
 5. Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: 
The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 71–73, 
98–99 (1995) (referencing sources that type competition as a masculine value and 
cooperation as a feminine value). 
 6. This is an especially important question for urban areas, where the bulk of 
sharing-economy activity takes place. See Nestor M. Davidson & John J. Infranca, 
The Sharing Economy as an Urban Phenomenon, 34 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 215 
(arguing that the sharing economy “is fundamentally an urban phenomenon” due to 
the “density, proximity, specialization, and even anonymity that mark city life”); 
Daniel E. Rauch & David Schleicher, Like Uber, but for Local Governmental Policy: 
The Future of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy” 5 (George Mason Univ. 
Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 15-01), http://www.law.gmu.edu/
assets/files/publications/working_papers/1501.pdf [https://perma.cc/JX67-L6FK] 
(highlighting how the density of urban spaces underlies the sharing economy).  In this 
way, this Article contributes to the literature on the relationship between gender and 
geography. See, e.g., Lisa Pruitt, Gender, Geography & Rural Justice, 23 BERKELEY 
J. GENDER L. & JUST. 338, 341-43 (2008) (arguing that geography is important for 
understanding gender equality and focusing specifically on the issues that face rural 
women); Naomi Schoenbaum, Mobility Measures, 2012 BYU L. REV. 1165, 1227–31 
(arguing that urban spaces can enhance gender equality by providing greater density 
of labor market opportunities for both husband and wife, reducing the need for long-
distance moves that tend to negatively affect women’s workplace equality); 
Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women’s Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-
Family Balance, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1797, 1826 (2007) (arguing that suburban 
sprawl—the increasing distance between home and work—hinders women’s 
workplace equality due to longer commute times that not only impact the ability to 
balance work and family but also tend to disproportionately limit women’s job 
opportunities and suggesting that denser urban areas can thus enhance women’s 
equality).  This Article helps to highlight the complex relationship between 
geography and gender equality.  On the one hand, by providing a dense labor market 
that reduces the need for long-distance moves and for long commutes, urban spaces 
alleviate some of the work-family tensions that contribute to women’s lack of labor 
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While the regulation of the sharing economy has received scholarly 
attention, little attention has been paid to the question of identity in 
the sharing economy, and especially to gender.7  Within this 
literature, scholars disagree on how much—if at all—the sharing 
economy changes the regulatory landscape across several areas of 
law.8  Much of the existing scholarship is focused on the descriptive 
question of whether and to what extent current law governs sharing-
economy transactions.9  But this focus tends to sidestep the critical 
normative consideration of the consequences of applying existing 
regulation to this changed context, including whether existing law will 
achieve its aims when applied in these sometimes quite different 
circumstances.  This Article concerns itself with this consideration in 
the context of sex discrimination law and sex equality. 
Building on prior scholarship on intimate work,10 this Article 
explains how the intimate nature of much of the transacting in the 
sharing economy heightens the salience of sex to both buyers and 
sellers there.  This is troubling for the legal sex equality project, 
whose goal has generally been to make sex less salient in the 
market.11  And, importantly, simply extending existing sex 
                                                                                                                 
market equality. See Schoenbaum, supra, at 1227–31; Silbaugh, supra, at 1826.  On 
the other hand, as this Article explores, if the sharing economy takes hold even more 
strongly as a source of work in cities, urban spaces may exacerbate the salience of sex 
at work, undermining women’s labor market equality. 
 7. See, e.g., Catherine Lee Rassman, Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling 
Innovation: Examining the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap”, and Why Pennsylvania 
Should Get on Board, 15 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81, (2014); Brishen Rogers, 
The Social Costs of Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85 (2015), 
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/sites/lawreview.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Dialogue/
Rogers_Dialogue.pdf [https://perma.cc/2322-AKWG]; Deborah F. Buckman, 
Liability and Regulation of Ride-Sharing Services Using Social Media, 6 A.L.R. 7th 
Art. 1 (June 2015); Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: 
Regulating the Sharing Economy, BOS. B.J. (Apr. 1, 2014), 
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/04/01/whats-old-becomes-new-regulating-the-
sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/R7KT-XDAF]. 
 8. Compare Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 989 (2016) (arguing in the tax context that current law is adequate to regulate 
the sharing economy), with Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the 
Sharing Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (2016) (arguing that the sharing 
economy “does not fit within existing legal frameworks”). 
 9. An important exception includes Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean 
Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH 1 
(2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2492798 [https://perma.cc/
QXK3-EFUT]. 
 10. Naomi Schoenbaum, The Law of Intimate Work, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1167 
(2015). 
 11. See generally Vicki Schultz, Taking Sex Discrimination Seriously, 91 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 995 (2015) (arguing that the success of employment discrimination law in 
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discrimination law to the sharing economy may not alleviate these 
troubles. 
As transactions increasingly occur in a space that blurs the 
traditional distinctions of home and market, not only is the salience of 
sex heightened, but also the law’s ability to address it is cabined.12  So 
even if sex discrimination law applies to the sharing economy, the 
more intimate nature of these transactions—and the consequences of 
intimacy for the operation of this law—limits the law’s ability to have 
the transformative effect that it has had in the traditional economy.13  
While some may celebrate a realm of market transactions with 
greater freedom to express intimate preferences, this expanded realm 
of freedom risks undermining the project of sex equality by reifying 
the salience of sex in the market. 
While this Article raises concerns about the impact of the sharing 
economy for women’s equality, it should not be read as a 
condemnation of the sharing economy in general or even for women.  
Surely, the sharing economy enhances utility, including women’s 
utility, in a variety of ways.  More analysis is required to assess on 
balance the impact of the sharing economy on women’s welfare.  This 
Article is meant only as a first intervention to raise some of the 
challenges that the sharing economy presents for gender equality. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, this Article sets 
forth the case for the heightened significance of identity in the sharing 
economy based on the intimacy of the transactions that occur there.  
It begins by explaining how transactions in the sharing economy take 
on a more intimate cast than transactions in the traditional economy.  
First, the place of sharing-economy transactions confers intimacy.  
Sharing-economy transactions often transcend the boundaries of 
home and market in that they occur in a seller’s or buyer’s private 
space.  Second, sharing-economy firms rely on intimacy as a risk-
reducing mechanism that confers trust.  This intimacy then magnifies 
the significance of the identity of buyers and sellers to a transaction.  
Identity traits serve as powerful signals of the type of services a seller 
provides or the type of customer the buyer will be, and intimacy 
                                                                                                                 
promoting sex equality in the market has been due to reducing the salience of sex by 
challenging essentialist notions of sex difference); infra note 102 and accompanying 
text. 
 12. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 13. See Janet Nadler & Kenworthey Bilz, Law, Psychology, and Morality, in 
MORAL COGNITION AND DECISION MAKING: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND 
MOTIVATION 101 (D. Medin et al. eds., 2009); John J. Donohue III & James 
Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy on 
the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. ECON. LIT. 1603 (1991). 
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intensifies preferences for the types of traits that identity signals.  
Sharing-economy firms’ personalization of transactions only 
heightens the significance of buyers’ and sellers’ identities, and the 
private spaces in which much of the transacting occurs allow 
discriminatory preferences to flourish largely unchecked. 
In Part II, this Article turns to focus specifically on the salience of 
sex in the sharing economy.  This Part begins by looking at sex 
preferences in the sharing economy, and identifies four interests that 
underlie these preferences: privacy interests; preferences for comfort 
and even pleasure; the desire for a space free of sexuality; and safety 
concerns.  This Part then catalogs the various manifestations of the 
salience of sex in the sharing economy.  From discrimination to 
segregation, what is perhaps most notable about these manifestations 
is how often they take the form of express sex-based preferences or 
distinctions, rather than the sorts of unconscious biases and subtle 
discrimination that have dominated much recent scholarship on 
discrimination.14  This suggests that our norms do not yet consider 
sex-based discrimination in market transactions that are marked by 
intimate or social features to be overly problematic. 
In Part III, this Article looks at the consequences of the salience of 
sex in the sharing economy.  The increasing blurring of home and 
work that the sharing economy creates presents challenges for the 
regulation of this sector and for the goals of sex equality.  This Part 
begins with a normative evaluation of the salience of sex in the 
sharing economy.  It considers both the promise and the threat of this 
phenomenon to the larger goals of the sex equality project of the 
market, concluding that the threat outweighs the promise.  Part III 
then assesses the ability of existing law to combat the salience of sex 
in the sharing economy.  It first addresses the uncertainty surrounding 
the application of existing sex discrimination law to the sharing 
economy.  It then explores how the market has responded in the face 
of this legal uncertainty and concludes that market responses alone 
have thus far been inadequate to constrain the salience of sex in the 
sharing economy, and indeed have often had the opposite effect.  
Even if current antidiscrimination laws were to apply to the sharing 
economy, the intimacy and other structural features of sharing-
economy transactions would sharply limit the promise of such laws to 
have the transformative effect on sex equality that they have had in 
the traditional economy.  Regardless then of whether current law 
extends to the sharing economy, the sharing economy should raise 
                                                                                                                 
 14. See infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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serious concern for proponents of sex equality.  This Part concludes 
with a few words on new directions the law might take to address this 
concern. 
I.  INTIMACY AND IDENTITY IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 
The sharing economy heightens the salience of the identity of both 
sellers and buyers because of the increased intimacy of the 
transactions therein.  This Part first describes the intimacy of sharing-
economy transactions, and then explains how intimacy makes identity 
more salient. 
A. Intimacy 
The sharing economy tends to encompass more intimate 
transactions than the traditional economy for two reasons.  First, the 
place of the transaction confers intimacy.  Sharing-economy 
transactions tend to merge home and market in that they occur in the 
seller’s or buyer’s private car or home.  Second, sharing economy 
firms rely on intimacy as a risk-reducing mechanism that confers trust.  
To overcome the riskiness of sharing-economy transactions, sharing-
economy firms rely not on firm reputation or other guarantees by the 
firm, but rather by making transactions more intimate, that is, by 
predicating transactions on personal information about buyers and 
sellers.  These mechanisms are discussed in turn. 
1. Place 
Transactions in the sharing economy are often more intimate than 
transactions in the traditional economy because of where they take 
place, outside of the traditional workplace.  Perhaps the most defining 
feature of the sharing economy is that it enables the disaggregation of 
the sale of one’s property (e.g., cars, homes) and labor.15  When it 
comes to property, this means that sellers are able to sell segments of 
their own personal property, such as rooms in their homes or rides in 
their cars, for short segments of time.  When it comes to labor, this 
means that sellers are able to sell smaller segments of their labor.  
The sale of disaggregated personal property often entails a seller 
having someone come into her home (AirBnB) or her car (Uber).16  
The sale of disaggregated personal labor often entails a seller 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 5–6. 
 16. See About Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/
GZ6B-Q8LC]; About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us 
[https://perma.cc/2KU4-PKBR]. 
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providing labor in the buyer’s home (TaskRabbit or 
Kitchensurfing).17 
The rise of the sharing economy then challenges the traditional 
sociological division between the “first place,” which is the home, the 
“second place,” which is the workplace, and the “third place,” which 
are communal spaces generally open to the public that may or may 
not be part of the market.18  Some sharing-economy transactions 
merge the first and second places.  For example, TaskRabbit, which 
allows consumers to hire “taskers” to complete a variety of tasks in 
their homes, renders the same space—the consumer’s home—the 
second place for the worker and the first place for the consumer.19  
Other sharing-economy transactions bring more merging of the first 
and third places.  For example, ride-sharing services render the same 
space—the seller’s car—the first place for workers (albeit in a private 
car rather than a private home) and the third place for consumers.  
Finally, some sharing-economy transactions merge the first, second, 
and third places.  For example, AirBnB and other home-sharing 
services render the same space—the seller’s home—the first and 
second places for the owner (who is working in her own home) and 
the third place for the consumer.20 
To be sure, it is not the case that these places are always neatly 
divided in the traditional economy.  Much service work in the 
traditional economy blurs the second and third places: the same 
setting, for example, a hair salon, is a second place for the worker and 
a third place for the consumer.21  And domestic service work blurs the 
first and second places: the same setting—the consumer’s home—is 
the second place for the worker and the first place for the consumer.22  
                                                                                                                 
 17. See TASKRABBIT, https://www.taskrabbit.com/ [https://perma.cc/7ENH-
D4B9]; “Uber” Your Cooking: The Sharing Economy Comes to Your Kitchen, 
FORBES (May 13, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/thehartmangroup/2015/05/13/
uber-your-cooking-the-sharing-economy-comes-to-your-kitchen/. 
 18. See generally RAY OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD PLACE: CAFES, COFFEE 
SHOPS, COMMUNITY CENTERS, BEAUTY PARLORS, GENERAL STORES, BARS, 
HANGOUTS, AND HOW THEY GET YOU THROUGH THE DAY (1999) (coining the term 
“third place,” and distinguishing it from the “first place” and the “second place”); 
Leo W. Jeffres et al., The Impact of Third Places on Community Quality of Life, 4 
APPLIED RES. QUALITY LIFE 333, 334 (2009) (listing as third places, inter alia, 
community centers, senior centers, coffee shops and cafes, bars and pubs, restaurants, 
shopping centers, stores, malls, markets, hair salons, barber and beauty shops, 
recreation centers, YM/WCA, pools, movie theaters). 
 19. See TASKRABBIT, supra note 17. 
 20. See AIRBNB, supra note 16. 
 21. This lends unique dynamics to much of this work. See Schoenbaum, supra 
note 10, at 1194, 1213. 
 22. See Roberts, supra note 4, at 60–61. 
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The point then is not that this blurring is entirely new or unique to the 
sharing economy, but that the size of the sharing economy calls these 
boundaries into question more than ever before, as more production 
and exchange occurs in private spaces.23  This shift in the place of 
productivity to private settings might be viewed as a return to the pre-
Industrial Revolution era, when much production was done in the 
home.24  This shift has significance for legal regulation, to which I 
return in Part III.  Here, my focus is on explaining how this shift 
makes transactions in the sharing economy more intimate. 
Sociologists have defined intimate interactions as those that 
depend on “particularized knowledge received, and attention 
provided by, at least one person–knowledge and attention that are 
not widely available to third parties.”25  The knowledge is not 
ordinary knowledge, but knowledge of special types of information 
such as “shared secrets, interpersonal rituals, bodily information, 
awareness of personal vulnerability, and shared memory of 
embarrassing situations.”26  Nor is the attention ordinary attention, 
but attention that encompasses “such elements as terms of 
endearment, bodily services, private languages, emotional support, 
and correction of embarrassing defects.”27 
The direct interaction between buyer and seller in more personal 
spaces makes these transactions intimate, giving access to private 
information that is not typically shared with others.  And the 
placement of these services in personal spaces primes the interactions 
to take on a more intimate character beyond the information that is 
revealed simply by virtue of the fact that the interaction takes place 
there.  Without the structure and signals of a third-party firm in an 
office setting mediating the transaction, buyers and sellers tend to fall 
back on the scripts of personal interaction in unregulated spaces like 
the home.28 
                                                                                                                 
 23. John Hawsworth & Robert Vaughan, The Sharing Economy – Sizing the 
Revenue Opportunity, PWC (2015), http://www.pwc.co.uk/issues/megatrends/
collisions/sharingeconomy/the-sharing-economy-sizing-the-revenue-opportunity.html 
[https://perma.cc/Q4HB-83VU] (estimating the potential value of the five main 
sharing-economy sectors to be $335 billion by 2015). 
 24. See, e.g., Frances Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and 
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1983). 
 25. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 14–15 (2005). 
 26. Id. at 15. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Marjorie L. De Vault, Home and Work: Negotiating Boundaries Through 
Everyday Life, 102 AM. J. SOC. 1491, 1491 (1997) (book review). 
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Note that not all transactions in the sharing economy are intimate, 
and of those that are intimate, some are more intimate than others.  
For example, one might rent out an apartment that one does not live 
in through AirBnB.  Unless the apartment owner chooses to meet the 
AirBnB renter or to include personal items in the apartment (e.g., 
photographs or mementos), this transaction would not be intimate.  
An AirBnB owner who rents out a room in her home with a shared 
bathroom engages in a more intimate transaction than one who rents 
out a separate apartment within her home.  Likewise, Uber drivers 
and those who ride with them can, to a large extent, choose how 
intimate to make their transactions by deciding how much 
information to reveal in conversation.  Some riders have chosen to 
make their transactions with ride-share drivers far more intimate, by, 
for example, sharing personal information and even changing in the 
backseat of the car.29 
2. Trust 
Transactions are risky.  Market transactions present risks for 
sellers—whether they will be compensated for the goods or services 
they sell—and for buyers—whether they will get the goods or services 
they bargained for.  In addition to these basic risks of transacting, 
buyers and sellers may face additional risks, such as the safety risk 
that arises when the transaction is face-to-face.  Searching for 
appropriate persons with whom to transact and assessing the 
reliability of market strangers involves significant transaction costs.30  
Firms help to mitigate these costs by building trust based on 
reputation.31 
                                                                                                                 
 29. See Winnie Hu, She Rides, a New York Taxi Service Aimed at Women, Finds 
a Loyal Following, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/12/
nyregion/new-york-taxi-service-aimed-at-women-finds-loyal-following.html 
[https://perma.cc/AF4S-S3W8]. 
 30. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9; see also The Rise of the Sharing 
Economy: On the Internet, Everything Is for Hire, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-
sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/YGJ6-94RZ]. 
 31. Benjamin G. Edelman & Michael Luca, Digital Discrimination: The Case of 
Airbnb.com 3 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 14-054, 2014), 
http://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/digital-discrimination-the-case-of-airbnb-com 
[https://perma.cc/KGY6-8UFC]; PWC, The Sharing Economy, Consumer 
Intelligence Series 16, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/technology/publications/
assets/pwc-consumer-intelligence-series-the-sharing-economy.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VK2V-56XX] (citing that “69% [of consumers surveyed] say they will not trust 
sharing-economy companies until they are recommended by someone they trust”).  
Of course, in addition to the role of reputation, law also places burdens on firms (and 
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In the sharing economy, technology has reduced the firm’s role in 
matching buyers and sellers.32  The term “peer-to-peer” economy, 
sometimes used to describe the sharing economy, nicely captures this.  
The sharing economy lowers transactions costs associated with 
matching consumers and producers, and these lowered transaction 
costs allow for the disaggregated consumption of goods and services.33  
Although such disaggregated consumption can take place through the 
use of mediating firms, and they long have (e.g., hotels, car rental 
companies), technology allows expansion of this model to enable 
more and more casual disaggregation of consumption.  This means 
that firms are relied on less, and transactions are based more on 
relationships between the consumer and producer.34  This fact already 
makes sharing-economy transactions more personal. 
With these more personal transactions and risks, the resulting need 
for trust remains.  Sharing-economy firms like Uber and AirBnB that 
connect buyers and sellers mediate some risks both by reputation and 
policy, but much less so than in the traditional economy.  This leads to 
the need for alternative sources of trust necessary for markets to 
operate.35 
One of the primary ways of engendering trust in the sharing 
economy is by making transactions between producers and consumers 
more personal: by replacing the trust placed in the firm with trust 
placed in individual sellers and buyers.36  Sharing-economy 
transactions are often made to turn on the individual’s characteristics.  
For many services, either sellers or buyers or both create profiles that 
reveal information about themselves, including their names and 
photographs.37  Both buyers and sellers can rate each other, and these 
                                                                                                                 
individuals) that reduce risks to sellers and buyers.  I return to a discussion of the role 
of law in Part III. 
 32. See Edelman & Luca, supra note 31, at 3. 
 33. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9. 
 34. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 97 (discussing how Uber drivers need to establish 
“micro-relationships” to earn certain ratings). 
 35. Rachel Botsman, The Currency of the New Economy Is Trust, TED (June 
2012), http://www.ted.com/talks/rachel_botsman_the_currency_of_the_new_economy
_is_trust?language=en [https://perma.cc/2XGV-K8XT] (“The currency of the new 
economy is trust.”). 
 36. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9. 
 37. See Why Do I Need to Have an Airbnb Profile or Profile Photo?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/67/why-do-i-need-to-have-an-airbnb-profile-or-
profile-photo [https://perma.cc/4MRG-7PZX]; Jamiev2014, Putting the “Pro” in 
Profile, TASKRABBIT BLOG (Apr. 10, 2013), https://blog.taskrabbit.com/2013/
04/10/putting-the-pro-in-profile/ [https://perma.cc/68QP-Z2XG]. 
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ratings feature prominently in online profiles.38  This intensifies the 
shift of focus of the transaction from one with the sharing-economy 
firm to one between the individual buyer and seller.39 
With this focus on the transaction between the buyer and the seller 
often comes a sense of social or personal connection between the two 
that sharing-economy firms emphasize.40  Indeed, some firms market 
themselves specifically on a model of intimacy.  Lyft, a ride-sharing 
competitor to Uber, has used the tagline: “your friend with a car.”41  
Tripda, a long-distance ride-sharing platform has emphasized the 
social nature of the service: “Why travel alone?  Carpool instead!  
Sharing a ride is fun & social.  We connect you with new and 
interesting people to share a ride with, while saving on your travel 
costs!”42  AirBnB has also marketed itself as a great way to meet 
people, including romantic partners.43 
                                                                                                                 
 38. See Rauch & Schleicher, supra note 6, at 9; How Are Ratings Calculated, 
UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/66ce3340-aa1f-4357-b955-027ef50441d3 
[https://perma.cc/6RQF-7BT6]. 
 39. As the founder of RelayRides, a car-sharing market-place, noted, “You meet 
great, interesting people.  You have great stories.” Singer, supra note 1; see also In 
the Battle Between Lyft And Uber, The Focus Is On Drivers, NPR ALL TECH 
CONSIDERED (Jan. 18, 2016), http://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2016/01/
18/463473462/is-uber-good-to-drivers-it-s-relative [https://perma.cc/937C-P294] 
(noting Lyft’s former tagline: “Your friend with a car.”). 
 40. One article raised concerns about the sharing economy for those with autism, 
who tend to want to avoid intimacy. See Lynne Soraya, Disability and the Sharing 
Economy, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 11, 2014), https://www.psychologytoday.com/
blog/aspergers-diary/201408/disability-and-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/
9A7S-3BPH].  For those with anti-intimacy preferences, the personalization of 
transactions in the sharing economy raises anxiety about the expectations for 
intimate interaction in such transactions.  It is acceptable to sit silently in a taxi, but 
perhaps not when one uses Uber or Lyft.  Given the expectations of intimacy, a 
passenger’s ratings may be affected by her anti-intimacy preference if she chooses not 
to engage with her driver.  The same concerns on the flip side could be raised for 
drivers with autism. 
 41. Jason Tanz, How AirBnB and Lyft Finally Got Americans to Trust Each 
Other, WIRED (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.wired.com/2014/04/trust-in-the-share-
economy/ [https://perma.cc/V8WV-279N]. 
 42. How It Works, SHARING TRIP, http://sharingtrip.in/how-it-work.html# 
[https://perma.cc/C8GH-K5EH].  Tripda ceased operations in February 2016.  
TRIPDA, https://tripda.com/ [https://perma.cc/47J4-QXF6]. 
 43. See Host Your Space and Make Money with Airbnb, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/host [https://perma.cc/5B2V-5XB8] (“Besides the extra 
income, hosts join a supportive worldwide community.”); Anh-Minh Le, “When 
Strangers Meet” Film Contest Winners, AIRBNB BLOG (Jan. 27, 2015), 
http://blog.airbnb.com/when-strangers-meet-film-contest-winners/ (sponsoring film 
contest about strangers meeting on AirBnB); When Strangers Meet: An Airbnb Love 
Story, AIRBNB BLOG (Feb. 13, 2015), http://blog.airbnb.com/strangers-to-soul-mates-
couples-who-met-through-airbnb/ [https://perma.cc/Z7PU-99MB?type=image] (“This 
is part of our special series ‘When Strangers Meet.’  Have you met someone special 
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The intended level of intimacy of the transaction may vary by the 
sharing-economy firm offering the service.  A driver who worked 
through both Uber and Lyft emphasizes the more personal 
relationship that Lyft tries to cultivate between its drivers and riders 
as compared with Uber: 
[Uber] recommends that drivers “wear a collared shirt and generally 
look professional.”  They also advise that drivers should open the 
door and put bags in the trunk.   
Lyft, conversely, encourages uniqueness.  Drivers are musicians, 
artists, and entrepreneurs like myself (among many other paths), 
and their personalities come through via their clothing and their 
cars.  Drivers create goofy concepts, such as the Disco Lyft, the 
Karaoke Lyft, and the Chalkboard Lyft.  Cars are still clean and 
safe, but rides are treated as an opportunity for an experience . . . . 
Lyft encourages you to be a good friend.  Provide a clean car, have 
fun, and don’t let your pal down.  The culture is goofy, fun, unique, 
and irreverent, just like a true bud.  You’re encouraged to be 
yourself and have fun.  Uber wants you to be a chauffeur and to 
treat the role as a career.  It’s run with military precision and 
professionalism is encouraged from drivers.44 
B. Identity 
As a general matter, whether in the traditional or sharing economy, 
intimacy tends to breed discrimination.  Intimacy enhances the 
salience of the particular worker and her identity to the consumer.45  
Intimate workers’ identities can be powerful signals.  The intimate 
worker is in many ways inseparable from her product: the intimate 
                                                                                                                 
through a chance encounter on Airbnb?  Friend, husband, wife, long lost soul mate: 
we want to hear your story.  It happens when you let your guard down.  When you 
open up to new adventures.  Or, as everyone and their mother says: Finding ‘the one’ 
happens when you’re not even looking for it.  So maybe we shouldn’t be surprised to 
discover an overwhelming number of couples who met and fell in love through the 
serendipitous circumstance of an Airbnb.  But we still are.  Every time.  From 
strangers to soul mates, we’re celebrating Valentine’s Day with the stories of couples 
who met through one fateful stay in an Airbnb.  This is one of them.”). 
 44. Greg Muender, Uber vs. Lyft: A Former Driver Compares the Two Services, 
PANDO (Dec. 3, 2014), https://pando.com/2014/12/03/uber-vs-lyft-a-former-driver-
compares-the-two-services/ [https://perma.cc/7BHE-L4WE]. 
 45. See, e.g., Harry J. Holzer & Keith R. Ihlanfeldt, Customer Discrimination and 
Employment Outcomes for Minority Workers, 113 Q.J. ECON. 835 (1998) (finding 
that the racial composition of an establishment’s customers has sizable effects on the 
race of who gets hired in jobs that involve direct contact with customer and 
hypothesizing that this is due to customer preferences in relationships). 
1036 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
services she provides.46  Thus, the worker’s identity characteristics 
“serve as signifiers . . . that shape expectations about the service they 
are to receive.”47  For example, the Filipina childcare worker is seen 
as caring, family-first, and docile.48  While the signal may not be 
reliable, it provides an easy shortcut when information is expensive 
and biases run deep.49 
Consumers may then perceive identity to be quite relevant to the 
provision of intimate services.  Identity may be seen to confer 
expertise: a woman may believe that a female gynecologist is better 
able to understand her problems.50  Identity preferences may also 
derive from a belief that the consumer will face less discrimination 
from workers who share the consumer’s identity.51  For example, a 
woman might believe that a female divorce lawyer would hold fewer 
biases against her choices in seeking alimony and child support.  The 
sensitive circumstances of intimate services can also lead consumers 
to be more comfortable with workers of a particular identity.52  
                                                                                                                 
 46. See Robin Leidner, Emotional Labor in Service Work, 561 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 81, 83 (1999); Amy S. Wharton, The Sociology of Emotional 
Labor, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 147, 152 (2009). 
 47. Wharton, supra note 46, at 152 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 48. See Cameron Lynne Macdonald & David Merrill, Intersectionality in the 
Emotional Proletariat, in SERVICE WORK: CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 113, 121–22 
(Marek Korczynski & Cameron Lynne Macdonald eds., 2009) (explaining that 
“racial/ethnic groups are preferred by parents [for caregivers] based on their 
presumed qualities that are rooted in their ethnicity,” and quoting a childcare 
placement agency owner: “people think that Filipinas are from a different planet 
where everybody cares about children”). 
 49. For the seminal discussion on labor market signals, see Michael A. Spence, 
Job Market Signaling, 87 Q.J. ECON. 355, 356–61 (1973), and for more general 
discussion on signals, see George Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489 (1970). 
 50. See Tamar Lewin, Women’s Health Is No Longer a Man’s World, N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 7, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/02/07/us/women-s-health-is-no-longer-a-
man-s-world.html [https://perma.cc/4TDF-XX4N] (discussing how women’s 
preference for female gynecologists is partially rooted in the belief that they will 
understand women’s health better because they are women). 
 51. This is at least part of the basis for same-race preferences in health care 
providers. See Jennifer Malat & Mary Ann Hamilton, Preference for Same-Race 
Health Care Providers and Perceptions of Interpersonal Discrimination in Health 
Care, 47 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 173 (2006); Frederick M. Chen et al., Patients’ 
Beliefs About Racism, Preferences for Physician Race, and Satisfaction with Care, 3 
ANNALS FAM. MED. 138 (2005) (analyzing surveys showing that minorities who 
perceive racism in the healthcare system are more likely to prefer physicians of the 
same race). 
 52. See, e.g., Lewin, supra note 50 (in context of gynecologists, noting that “many 
women find it easier to talk to another woman when the subject is sexuality or 
menopause or pregnancy”). 
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Intimacy also strengthens the motivation to discriminate in the other 
direction—from sellers against buyers.53 
In the sharing economy, the shift in focus from an impersonal 
transaction with a firm to a personal interaction between individuals 
makes the identity of both the buyer and the seller more salient.54  
Photographs and even names can reveal identity traits like race and 
sex.55  This personalization of the transaction not only enables 
discrimination,56 but by focusing the basis of trust in the relationship 
between seller and buyer, it heightens the salience of the identity of 
the transacting parties, heightening the odds of discrimination.57  
Indeed, it is precisely “‘[t]he social nature of the sharing economy 
                                                                                                                 
 53. In the traditional economy, the issue of discrimination against consumers has 
focused on discrimination that arises out of religious and moral preferences of 
workers, e.g., a wedding vendor who refuses service to gay couples. See, e.g., 
Washington v. Arlene’s Flowers, No. 13-2-00871-5 (Wash. Super. Feb. 18, 2015)  
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/2015-02-18—ord._denying_
defs._msj_and_granting_pls._and_wa_states_msj.pdf [https://perma.cc/LU8J-4LJA] 
(upholding discrimination challenge to wedding florist’s refusal to serve gay couple 
against First Amendment defenses); Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 
(N.M. 2013) (upholding discrimination challenge to wedding photographer’s refusal 
to serve gay couple against First Amendment defenses); Michael Paulson & 
Fernanda Santos, Religious Right in Arizona Cheers Bill Allowing Businesses to 
Refuse to Serve Gays, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
02/22/us/religious-right-in-arizona-cheers-bill-allowing-businesses-to-refuse-to-serve-
gays.html [https://perma.cc/6RK6-SNA8]. 
 54. See Stacy Perman, Is Uber Dangerous for Women?, MARIE CLAIRE (May 20, 
2015), http://www.marieclaire.com/culture/news/a14480/uber-rides-dangerous-for-
women [https://perma.cc/64BD-WDSG] (quoting David Plouffe, former Obama 
campaign manager now serving as Uber’s senior vice president of public policy and 
strategy: “[T]he relationship that is most important to an Uber rider is that 
relationship with their Uber driver, and it’s one that they really cherish.”). 
 55. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More 
Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market 
Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 991–92 (2004). 
 56. Edelman & Luca, supra note 31, at 9–11 (documenting race discrimination 
against sellers on AirBnB); Ian Ayres, Mahzarin R. Banaji, & Christine Jolls, Race 
Effects on Ebay, 46 RAND J. ECON. 891 (2015) (documenting race discrimination 
against sellers of baseball cards on Ebay by varying race of person holding the card).  
The ratings system may be one mechanism by which discriminatory bias is 
manifested. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 95; Greg Harman, The Sharing Economy Is 
Not as Open as You Might Think, THEGUARDIAN (Nov. 12, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2014/nov/12/algorithms-race-
discrimination-uber-lyft-airbnb-peer [https://perma.cc/HX2P-YHT2]. 
 57. The New Sidecar Has Arrived, SIDECAR (Feb. 19, 2014), 
https://www.side.cr/the-new-sidecar-has-arrived/ [https://perma.cc/YJ92-6S4Q] (“You 
can now differentiate yourself by the picture of your car, your profile photo, or your 
amazing attitude and the service you provide.  Sidecar’s new “bumper sticker” gives 
you the ability to advertise what’s great about your ride and increases your chance of 
getting chosen by riders.”). 
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[that renders it] more vulnerable [to identity preferences] than the 
traditional economy.’”58 
Other circumstances related to the intimacy of sharing-economy 
transactions make identity preferences particularly likely to flourish 
there.  The privacy of sharing-economy transactions means that these 
transactions take place in contexts that lack structural features that 
constrain discrimination.  In the traditional economy, transactions are 
more likely to be entered into in public in the presence of others, 
rather than in front of a computer in the privacy of one’s own home, 
or on one’s smartphone.59  The publicness of interacting in the 
traditional economy means that buyers and sellers are more likely to 
be subject to the pressures of social norms, including the norm of 
nondiscrimination.60  Transacting online in the sharing economy, with 
no one watching, makes it easier to act on discriminatory preferences, 
without any sense of the constraint of being monitored. 
Moreover, in the traditional economy, institutional 
antidiscrimination structures may bring benefits that trickle down 
even to those who are not protected by antidiscrimination law.  For 
example, equal opportunity and sexual harassment trainings for 
employees in a traditional firm may mean that supervisors and 
coworkers are less likely to discriminate not only against employees 
who are protected by antidiscrimination law, but also against 
independent contractors who work in the same place.61  In the 
workplace-less sharing economy, such institutional structures are 
largely absent. 
II.  THE SALIENCE OF SEX IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 
The last Part explained how the more intimate nature of sharing- 
economy transactions heightens the salience of identity in these 
transactions.  This Part focuses specifically on one feature of 
                                                                                                                 
 58. Jenna Wortham, Ubering While Black, MEDIUM (Oct. 23, 2014), 
https://medium.com/matter/ubering-while-black-146db581b9db [https://perma.cc/
64WE-4TEX] (quoting Michael Luca). 
 59. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 95. 
 60. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, ‘How’s My Driving?’ for Everyone (and 
Everything), 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1699, 1759–65 (2006) (discussing monitoring and 
norm compliance). 
 61. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005) (discussing the role that firms play in 
enforcing employment discrimination law); Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 (2001) 
(same); cf. Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061 (2003) 
(documenting firms’ rigorous enforcement of sexual harassment law). 
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identity—sex—and discusses how the sex of both buyer and seller 
plays a substantial role in the sharing economy.  This Part first 
describes how, in these intimate settings, sex preferences flourish due 
to interests related to privacy, comfort, enjoyment, sexuality, and 
security, which are discussed in turn.  This Part then discusses the way 
that these sex preferences manifest in the sharing economy in the 
forms of discrimination and segregation. 
A. Explanations 
1. Privacy 
As for privacy interests, services that entail bodily intimacy, 
whether through physical touching, visual display, or simply sensitive 
information about the body, generate preferences for service 
providers of a particular sex.  One common preference among female 
customers is for female gynecologists.62  We can see this preference 
being met by the market, which has produced all-female gyms63 and 
weight-loss centers.64  Firms routinely ask customers whether they 
have a sex preference when providing services ranging from massage 
therapy65 to hair styling.66 
A number of sharing-economy transactions raise these privacy 
concerns.  If an AirBnB guest is sharing a dwelling and especially a 
bathroom with her host, privacy concerns might arise for both guest 
                                                                                                                 
 62. See Lewin, supra note 50 (documenting that women now comprise over 
seventy percent of ob-gyn residents and attributing this to patient demand).  In the 
past fifteen years, the rising demand for female gynecologists and obstetricians has 
led to a rise in all-female practices. See Kate Stone Lombardi, A Clinic Where All 
the Doctors Are Women, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/
12/03/nyregion/in-business-a-clinic-where-all-the-doctors-are-women.html 
[https://perma.cc/ZS48-H3AC]; WOMEN OB/GYN, http://www.womenobgyn.com 
[https://perma.cc/T234-ZLA6] (giving the tagline “Women, helping women” and 
describing a “group of five female OB/GYN’s, and three nurse practitioners,” with a 
photograph of only women providers). 
 63. See generally EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying 
BFOQ for health club instructors). 
 64. See generally EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) 
(denying BFOQ for weight-loss center counselors). 
 65. See Erika Allen, The First Issue in Any Massage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 16, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/16/fashion/massages-first-issue-man-or-woman-
therapist.html [https://perma.cc/8PMS-PXH6] (explaining that when a customer is 
booking a massage, a spa’s first question is often, “Do you prefer a male or female 
massage therapist?”). 
 66. See Select Service(s) and Employee(s), Bubbles Hair Salon, BUBBLES, 
https://bubbles.mylocalsalon.com/onlinebooking/v7410/Steps/SelectServices.aspx 
[https://perma.cc/YX6W-BLRW]. 
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and host.  As the Ninth Circuit discussed in a case holding that the 
roommate relationship was protected by the right to intimate 
association, “[a]side from immediate family or a romantic partner, it’s 
hard to imagine a relationship more intimate than that between 
roommates, who share living rooms, dining rooms, kitchens, 
bathrooms, even bedrooms.”67  As the court explained:  
The home is the center of our private lives.  Roommates note our 
comings and goings, observe whom we bring back at night, hear 
what songs we sing in the shower, see us in various stages of undress 
and learn intimate details most of us prefer to keep private.  
Roommates also have access to our physical belongings and to our 
person . . . . Taking on a roommate means giving him full access to 
the space where we are most vulnerable . . . .68   
The court specifically recognized how the intimacy of a shared 
dwelling can generate sex preferences: “women will often look for 
female roommates because of modesty . . . concerns.  As roommates 
often share bathrooms and common areas, a girl may not want to 
walk around in her towel in front of a boy.”69 
While home-sharing as offered by sharing-economy firms like 
AirBnB is typically not as intimate as the roommate relationship 
because it is short term, it still raises many of the same concerns even 
in the limited time period during which the dwelling is shared.  Such 
persons may have “unfettered access to the home,” which “implicates 
significant privacy . . . considerations.”70  And such bodily privacy 
concerns are not limited to home-sharing services in the sharing 
economy.  One female ride-sharing passenger shared a story of 
changing her clothes in the backseat of her ride-share car, and noted 
that she only felt comfortable doing so because the driver was a 
woman.71 
2. Comfort/Pleasure 
Beyond preferences based in bodily intimacy, sex preferences often 
arise out of increased comfort with those of the same sex in 
emotionally intimate settings.  For example, studies have shown that 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 
1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id.  This short-term, iterative nature of home-sharing guests also distinguishes 
them from roommates in that hosts will likely have many home-sharing guests, but 
few roommates. 
 71. See Hu, supra note 29. 
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most women prefer female psychotherapists,72 and firms that provide 
services addressing emotionally intimate services—from divorce 
lawyers73 to nannies74—advertise on the basis of sex.  These sex 
preferences in emotionally intimate contexts are not simply about 
comfort, but about pleasure for those who prefer their transactions to 
be more rather than less intimate.  For those who have such 
preferences, transacting with a person of the same sex can be seen to 
facilitate this intimacy.  Women often find it easier to discuss personal 
matters with other women, particularly in the provision and 
consumption of intimate services.75 
A driver for a taxi service aimed at women said that she preferred 
driving women because “[m]en would tell her to drive faster, or talk 
about sports,” whereas “[w]omen opened up about their lives.”76  She 
explained: “I bet you, if it had been a man, they would have stayed 
                                                                                                                 
 72. See, e.g., Bernadette M. Lauber & Jean Drevenstedt, Older Adults’ 
Preferences for Age and Sex of a Therapist, 14 CLIN. GERONTOLOGIST 13 (1994) 
(finding sex preferences for therapists); Cynthia F. Pikus & Christopher L. Heavey, 
Client Preferences for Therapist Gender, 10 J.C. STUDENT PSYCHOL. 35 (1996) 
(finding that women prefer women therapists and that men express little preference).  
These sex preferences based on emotional intimacy can be seen in case law. See 
Healey v. Southwood Psychiatric Hosp., 78 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1996) (accepting 
BFOQ in part based in theory that female counselors could better serve girls with 
emotional troubles). 
 73. See generally THE WOMEN’S LAW GROUP, http://thewomenslawgroup.com 
[https://perma.cc/KSR7-ZDQ3] (describing a practice of “female attorneys 
who . . . practice law from a woman’s perspective,” and who “understand that going 
through a divorce, custody issue, or other family law matter can be one of the most 
difficult times of your life”); WOMEN’S DIVORCE RIGHTS, 
http://www.womensdivorcerights.com/about.php [https://perma.cc/2C9B-3QTA] 
(“[f]ounded . . . to support, inspire, and encourage women . . . during each stage of 
their lives”). 
 74. See, e.g., RENT A MOM INC., http://www.rentamominc.com 
[https://perma.cc/BDV7-3AYF] (“The Company with a Heart for Families”); RENT A 
GRANDMA, http://rentagrandma.com [https://perma.cc/8HSD-VDJK]. 
 75. See Lauber & Drevenstedt, supra note 72, at 13; Pikus & Heavey, supra note 
72, at 35 (women prefer female therapists); Debra L. Roter et al., Physician Gender 
Effects in Medical Communication: A Meta-Analytic Review, 288 PATIENT-
PHYSICIAN RELATIONSHIP 756, 759 (2002) (both men and women prefer female 
primary care physicians due to communication styles); see also Klea D. Bertakis et 
al., Patient-Centered Communication in Primary Care: Physician and Patient Gender 
and Gender Concordance, 18 J. WOMEN’S HEALTH 4, 4 (2009) (intersection of female 
doctor with female patient results in more interactive conversations focused on 
patient’s illness, experience, and personal factors); Debra Roter et al., Effects of 
Obstetrician Gender on Communication and Patient Satisfaction,  93 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 5, 5–6 (1999) (women have a strong preference for female doctors in 
obstetrics and gynecology). 
 76. See Hu, supra note 29. 
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quiet.”77  We also see these preferences exercised in the sharing 
economy.  Several ride-sharing firms advertise the ability to select 
women drivers or an all-female driving experience as a way to 
enhance the comfort and enjoyment of the trip.78 
Comfort may also generate sex-based preferences that are 
consistent with stereotypical male and female roles.  The placement 
of many of sharing-economy services in the home triggers the 
traditional family roles of men and women even more strongly than 
when workers act in the market.  So when selecting “taskers” for 
assistance with household chores through a sharing-economy firm like 
TaskRabbit, consumers may feel more comfortable with those that fill 
stereotypical gender roles: female taskers for cleaning and caring for 
children, and male taskers for home repairs or to help move 
furniture.79 
3. Sex 
Sex is a motivation for gender preferences in intimate spaces.  
When women want to keep sexuality out of an intimate space, they 
                                                                                                                 
 77. Id. 
 78. Jay Barman, Sidecar Now Lets You Choose Women Drivers, SFIST (Dec. 19, 
2014), http://sfist.com/2014/12/19/sidecar_now_lets_you_choose_women_d.php 
[https://perma.cc/64SM-RG8M]; Hiawatha Bray, Hitchhiking Goes Digital with 
Tripda Ride Sharing Service, BOS. GLOBE (Nov. 21, 2014), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2014/11/21/hitchhiking-goes-digital-with-
tripda-ride-sharing-service/4JjciQxKybC2FD7HymwxUK/story.html 
[https://perma.cc/XP46-WC5C] (“Tripda also features a ladies-only option for women 
who would rather not take a long trip in the company of a male stranger”).   
The heightened intimacy of the sharing economy may increase demands for 
emotional labor, which may disproportionately burden women.  Arlie Hochschild 
identified emotional labor as a problem in the traditional workplace. See ARLIE 
RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN 
FEELING 7 (2d ed. 2003) (providing the seminal study on invisible emotional labor—
work we do to create a particular feeling or state of mind in others—and 
documenting a variety of resulting harms); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, 
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1307 (2000) (explaining how invisible 
work is not rewarded formally or informally).  Emotional labor is likely to be even 
more of a problem in the sharing economy, because there is more direct interaction 
between buyers and sellers, and ratings-based evaluations mean that sellers need to 
please buyers, and buyers need to please sellers.  This may have a disparate impact 
on women, because women are judged less favorably than men when they provide 
support, and more harshly than men when they decline to provide it. See Madeline E. 
Heilman & Julie J. Chen, Same Behavior, Different Consequences: Reactions to 
Men’s and Women’s Altruistic Citizenship Behavior, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 431, 
434–40 (2005). 
 79. See TASKRABBIT BLOG, supra note 37.  See infra Part I.B for further 
discussion of how sharing-economy firms themselves reinforce these preferences. 
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may seek to do so by preserving an all-female space.80  
Heteronormative assumptions of course underlie this strategy: that 
concerns about sex and sexual arousal raised by intimacy can be 
quelled by providing these services in a same-sex space.81  Civil and 
criminal law once did enforce a norm of no-sex between members of 
the same sex, constructing same-sex spaces as sex-free zones.82  
Although recent changes in law undermine these heteronormative 
assumptions, the strategy persists.83  Given the intimacy of the shared 
spaces of the sharing economy, both buyers and sellers of ride-sharing 
and home-sharing services have expressed preferences for all-female 
spaces to avoid the injection of sexuality there.84 
Men too have gender preferences that are rooted in sex and 
sexuality.  Men may prefer female service providers in intimate spaces 
as a way to avoid connotations of homosexuality, as in the case of 
men’s preference for female massage therapists,85 or as a way to inject 
sexuality into the transaction, as in the case of restaurants like 
Hooter’s.86  One concern with allowing ride-sharing passengers to 
select the sex of their drivers is precisely that men would select 
women drivers to engage in a sexually charged transaction.87  In fact, 
Uber has relied on this preference as a marketing device.  In 2014, it 
offered a promotion in France for rides with “Avions de Chasse” 
                                                                                                                 
 80. See, e.g., Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 
666 F.3d 1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a woman might prefer a female 
roommate because “[s]he might also worry about unwanted sexual advances or 
becoming romantically involved with someone she must count on to pay the rent”). 
 81. Id.; see also Naomi Schoenbaum, Heteronormativity in Employment 
Discrimination Law, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 5-8 (2017). 
 82. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 83. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (finding constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding 
anti-sodomy laws unconstitutional). 
 84. See Winnie Hu, New Service Offers Taxis Exclusively for Women, N.Y. TIMES 
(Sept. 7, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/08/nyregion/new-service-offers-taxis-
exclusively-for-women.html [https://perma.cc/383T-R7WY] (a driver for a female-
only service described the service as akin to the female-only gym she joined after she 
“tired of men flirting with her while she was working out”). 
 85. See Allen, supra note 65. 
 86. A final reason for some sex preferences is religion.  For example, Hasidic 
Jewish women will only ride with women drivers. See Hu, New Service Offers Taxis 
Exclusively for Women, supra note 84. 
 87. See Barman, supra note 78 (“The only downside now, though, comes for 
female Sidecar drivers, who say they could face further harassment from male 
passengers who select them on purpose (and, we would guess, when drunk?).  
Because, yes, the gender preference is available to all users, male and female.”). 
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(“hot chick” drivers) with the tagline, “Who said women don’t know 
how to drive?”88 
4. Safety 
Many sharing-economy services, precisely because of the intimate 
nature of where they occur, raise safety concerns.  Because these 
transactions often occur in a private home or vehicle, usually with no 
one else present besides the buyer and seller, they render both the 
buyer and seller vulnerable to physical and sexual security risks.  And 
the close private quarters in which these transactions take place 
makes it difficult or impossible for a buyer or seller who feels 
threatened to exit. 
Safety concerns have been raised frequently in the context of ride-
sharing services, and affect both passengers and drivers.89  As for 
passengers, ride-sharing services have faced a slew of assault 
allegations against their drivers.90  Uber has faced numerous 
complaints of sexual assault by its drivers in Boston, Chicago, Los 
Angeles, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Washington, D.C., and other 
cities.91  In December 2014, an Uber driver in New Delhi was charged 
                                                                                                                 
 88. Rebecca Greenfield, Want More Female Uber Drivers?  Here’s How to Make 
It Happen, FAST CO., http://www.fastcompany.com/3043622/most-innovative-
companies/want-more-female-uber-drivers-heres-how-to-make-it-happen 
[https://perma.cc/296J-D3GA]; Schuyler Velasco, Can Uber Solve Its Women 
Problem, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2015/
0310/Can-Uber-solve-its-women-problem [https://perma.cc/JGS4-ZCQ2]. 
 89. See Reported List of Incidents Involving Uber and Lyft, WHO’S DRIVING 
YOU?, http://www.whosdrivingyou.org/rideshare-incidents [https://perma.cc/NB8B-
Q3F4]. 
 90. Perman, supra note 54. 
 91. Id. (describing among other incidents one where an Uber driver in Houston 
was charged with sexually assaulting an intoxicated woman he had picked up from a 
bar and driven back to his home); Velasco, supra note 88; see also Steve Annear et 
al., Uber Driver Charged with Assault, BOS. GLOBE (Feb. 9, 2015), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/02/09/boston-uber-driver-charged-with-
indecent-assault-and-battery-boston-police-say/k9eKsX2q95hA9bdM13IorJ/
story.html [https://perma.cc/79XR-CPCR] (reporting multiple incidents of sexual 
assaults by Uber drivers against female passengers, including a rape and several 
indecent assaults); Sarah Gray, Updated: Uber Calls What Amounts to a 2-Hour 
Kidnapping an “Inefficient Route”, SALON (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.salon.com/
2014/10/14/uber_calls_what_amounts_to_a_2_hour_kidnapping_an_inefficient_route/ 
[https://perma.cc/9V2N-352W]; Perry Stein, Uber Driver Charged with Sexually 
Assaulting Passenger in D.C., WASH. CITY PAPER (July 28, 2014), 
http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/2014/07/28/uber-driver-charged-
with-sexually-assaulting-passenger-in-d-c/ [https://perma.cc/VRR2-UFVU] (reporting 
on affidavit of passenger accusing Uber driver of molesting her after she passed out 
in his car).  
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with kidnapping and raping a passenger, prompting a temporary ban 
in that city.92 
Drivers too face safety concerns.  While ride-sharing services 
provide one safety advantage over traditional taxi driving—being 
cashless—they still present dangers to drivers.93  Female drivers 
report various forms of sexual harassment by riders, particularly by 
intoxicated men, including being propositioned for sex, facing other 
unwanted come-ons, and even physical fondling.94  Female drivers 
also report non-sexual physical assaults.95  And female Uber drivers 
have faced harassment from male passengers who have located them 
using the service’s “Lost and Found” feature, which allows passengers 
to get directly in touch with their drivers if they believe they have left 
behind their belongings.96 
Other sharing-economy services also pose safety concerns.  For 
example, AirBnB hosts and guests face security risks.  Guests have 
                                                                                                                 
Uber has other “women problem[s].” See Greenfield, supra note 88; Anita Little, 
Five Reasons to Delete Your Uber App, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://msmagazine.com/blog/2014/11/20/5-reasons-to-delete-your-uber-app/ 
[https://perma.cc/X7QN-S57X]; Velasco, supra note 88.  At the corporate level, Uber 
is known for a “bro-culture.” Chloe Angyal, Uber’s Plan to Employ More Female 
Drivers Won’t Empower Women, THE NEW REPUBLIC (Mar. 23, 2015), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/121348/ubers-plan-employ-women-drivers-awful 
[https://perma.cc/6GJP-55TG].  In 2014, Uber CEO Kalanick provoked ire for calling 
his company “Boob-er” in a GQ profile, referring to the role that Uber’s success has 
played in boosting his sex appeal. Id.  That same year, the company apologized for its 
French promotion offering attractive women drivers. Id.  As discussed below, Uber 
has a lower proportion of female drivers than any of its major competitors, and few 
female executives. Id. (noting that women comprise 14% of Uber’s drivers as 
compared with 30% of Lyft’s drivers and 40% of Sidecar’s drivers, and that of Uber’s 
top fifty employees, only six are women). 
 92. See Velasco, supra note 88. 
 93. See Greenfield, supra note 88. 
 94. Ellen Huet, Why Aren’t There More Female Uber and Lyft Drivers?, FORBES 
(Apr. 9, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/04/09/female-uber-lyft-
drivers [https://perma.cc/P6N8-YFKP] (reporting among other incidents one in 
January 2015 in Atlanta when an intoxicated male passenger asked his female driver 
to take him to a strip club, and if she wanted to “make some extra money” by 
“danc[ing] for him”; after she refused, the passenger rubbed her thighs and breasts 
and tried to kiss her). 
 95. Id. (describing incident in Los Angeles where female driver alleged that two 
male passengers hit her in the face with a thorny rose after she asked them not to 
slam her car door). 
 96. See Johana Bhuiyan, Men Are Using Uber’s Lost-and-Found Feature to 
Harass Female Drivers, BUZZFEED (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
johanabhuiyan/faced-with-harassment-female-uber-drivers-often-left-to-fend#.ojJ9J
MAq3 [https://perma.cc/E985-PWD4] (reporting incidents where male passengers 
have contacted female drivers using the feature and even visited their homes by using 
a combination of this feature and Apple’s Find My iPhone feature). 
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been drugged, sexually assaulted, and held hostage by their hosts.97  
Again, in the context of roommates, the Ninth Circuit emphasized the 
safety concerns of shared dwellings, explaining that “[w]e are at our 
most vulnerable when we are asleep because we cannot monitor our 
own safety or the security of our belongings.”98 
Both female service providers and female consumers in the sharing 
economy have expressed preferences for transacting with women as a 
way to mitigate these safety concerns.99  The market has followed.  
Several ride-sharing firms market a feature that allows passengers to 
select the sex of their driver as a safety measure.100  One of Uber’s 
primary responses to safety concerns has been to pledge to hire more 
women drivers.101 
B. Manifestations 
The features of the sharing economy and the sex preferences 
therein discussed in the last subparts have made gender salient in the 
sharing economy.  One notable feature of the salience of sex in these 
settings is that sex is salient not simply as a product of unconscious 
biases or structural features of the market, which of late have been 
                                                                                                                 
 97. See, e.g., Marie Lisa Jose, First, Listen to My Story of Being Drugged on an 
Airbnb Stay, Then Learn from It, MATADOR (Aug. 13, 2013), 
http://matadornetwork.com/trips/drugged-and-terrified-an-airbnb-booking-gone-
wrong/ [https://perma.cc/5DRA-765Q]; Scott Stump, Airbnb Horror Story Reveals 
Safety Issues for Lodging Site, TODAY (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.today.com/money/
airbnb-horror-story-reveals-safety-issues-lodging-site-t39091 [https://perma.cc/5CJF-
3EZS]. 
 98. Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, LLC, 666 F.3d 
1216, 1221 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 99. See Hu, supra note 84; Barman, supra note 78. 
 100. See Bray, supra note 78; Seven Ways to #RideSafe This Season with Sidecar, 
SIDECAR BLOG (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.side.cr/seven-ways-to-ride-safe-this-
season-with-sidecar/ [https://perma.cc/PM9X-B84L] (“Sidecar is here with some tips 
from our female drivers on how to ride snug and safe during the most wonderful (and 
busiest!) time of the year . . . Seven Ways to Ride Safe this Season (with Sidecar!)  Be 
Choosy: If you prefer to ride in a newer car or with a woman at the wheel, go ahead 
and choose!”). 
 101. See Jessica Goldstein, You Shouldn’t Have to Hire a Female Driver: Uber’s 
Hiring Pledge Isn’t Enough, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 12, 2015), 
http://thinkprogress.org/culture/2015/03/12/3633002/shouldnt-female-driver-ubers-
hiring-pledge-isnt-enough/ [https://perma.cc/7EEN-H4F5]; Meet the Uber Team 
Driving Our Women Partner Program, UBER (July 27, 2015), 
http://newsroom.uber.com/2015/07/meet-the-uber-team-driving-our-women-partner-
program/ [https://perma.cc/DF8J-ZEWF] (one million women drivers globally by 
2020).  In March 2015, Uber announced a partnership with UN Women in its goal to 
create a million new driving jobs for women by 2020. Angyal, supra note 91.  After 
barely a week, responding to criticism from women’s rights and labor groups, UN 
Women called off the partnership. Id. 
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the dominant explanations for continuing inequality in the market.102  
Much of the sex discrimination and segregation that we see in the 
sharing economy is based in express discriminatory preferences and 
even outright segregation.103  This Subpart will discuss the 
manifestations of sex-based preferences in the sharing economy. 
                                                                                                                 
 102. See, e.g., Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The 
Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. 
L. REV. 1893, 1895– 96 (2009); Peggy C. Davis, Law of Microaggression, 98 YALE L.J. 
1559, 1561–62 (1989); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A 
Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1186–1217 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and 
Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 317 
(1987); Ian F. Haney Lopez, Institutional Racism: Judicial Conduct and a New 
Theory of Racial Discrimination, 109 YALE L.J. 1717, 1808 (2000); Ann C. McGinley, 
Viva Law Evolucion!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 415, 421–46 (2000); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent 
Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 899, 902–15 (1993); Barbara F. Reskin, The 
Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination, 29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 321–23 
(2000); Sturm, supra note 61, at 460 (2001).  For a critique of this scholarly trend, see 
generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1 (2006). 
Note that we do also need to be concerned about how both conscious and 
unconscious biases operate in the sharing economy.  Such biases can work their way 
into both buyers’ and sellers’ profiles by way of ratings. Abraham Riesman, We 
Asked 10 Black-Car Drivers If They Prefer Working for Lyft or Uber—Here’s Why 
Lyft Won by a Landslide, N.Y. MAG. (Dec. 7, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2014/12/lyft-uber-drivers.html# [https://perma.cc/B9BD-FBJU] (“Nine 
out of ten times, it’s the foreigners that aren’t good at speaking English that frustrate 
a customer.  If they’re trying to get somewhere and the language is a barrier, it’s 
difficult.  They don’t mean to give the driver a bad [average] rating.  But based on 
communication skills, they’re giving you the rating on that.”).  These ratings are used 
not only by buyers and sellers to determine with whom to transact, but also by 
sharing-economy firms.  For example, Uber will drop drivers if their rating gets too 
low, see id., and Lyft won’t match a driver with a rider again if either party rated the 
other party fewer than four stars, see Harry Campbell, My Rating System for Uber 
and Lyft Passengers, THE RIDESHARE GUY (Aug. 31, 2015), 
http://therideshareguy.com/my-rating-system-for-uber-and-lyft-passengers 
[https://perma.cc/GM7Q-ZH5F]. 
 103. This may flow from the fact that the norms against the expression of sex 
preferences in intimate spaces are far weaker than norms against, say, race 
discrimination, as we can see in the ongoing sex segregation of certain intimate 
spaces, including bathrooms and locker rooms.  See Mary Anne Case, All the 
World’s the Men’s Room, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1655, 1656 (2007) (mentioning her work 
on “public toilets as gendered spaces”); Mary Anne Case, Toilet Survey, 
http://webcast-law.uchicago.edu/toiletsurvey/form/ [https://perma.cc/VXZ6-54Q3] 
(seeking to gather data on sex-segregated toilet facilities); Mary Anne Case, 
Changing Room? A Quick Tour of Men’s and Women’s Rooms in U.S. Law over the 
Last Decade, from the U.S. Constitution to Local Ordinances, 13 PUB. CULTURE 333 
(2001) [hereinafter Case, Changing Room?] (documenting sex segregation of public 
toilets); Danielle A. Schmidt, Bathroom Bias: Making the Case for Trans Rights 
Under Disability Law, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 155, 161 (2013) (discussing bathroom 
segregation in the workplace). 
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As referenced above, one response to sex preferences has been 
discrimination in the selection of both sellers and buyers.104  Some 
ride-sharing companies have allowed riders to select a driver of his or 
her preferred sex.105  One long-distance ride-sharing service, Trypda, 
also allows drivers to choose only female passengers.106  These 
options apparently have been quite popular.  After Sidecar 
introduced this option, many of their female drivers reported an 
increase in ride requests from female passengers.107  And other 
sharing-economy services that allow consumers to select workers 
based on a profile complete with name and photograph, such as 
home-sharing services like AirBnB and in-home task services like 
TaskRabbit, permit easy discrimination on the basis of sex. 
Sex segregation is another manifestation of the salience of sex in 
the sharing economy.  Lyft began as a ride-sharing service for women 
only.108  While Lyft ultimately decided to provide service to both men 
and women, recent taxi services like SheTaxis, which provides an all-
female taxi service by connecting female drivers with female 
passengers, suggests that a sharing-economy version is not far 
behind.109  The sharing economy is also marked by significant 
informal segregation by sex. Sex segregation is particularly marked 
among drivers for ride-sharing services.  Women constitute 14% of 
Uber’s drivers, 30% of Lyft’s drivers, and 40% of Sidecar’s drivers.110  
                                                                                                                 
 104. See supra Part I.B. 
 105. See Bray, supra note 78; SIDECAR BLOG, supra note 100. 
 106. See Bray, supra note 78. 
 107. See Bhuiyan, supra note 96; Kaleigh Rogers, Why Doesn’t Uber Let Women 
Passengers Choose Women Drivers, MOTHERBOARD (Apr. 6, 2015), 
http://motherboard.vice.com/read/why-doesnt-uber-let-women-passengers-choose-
women-drivers [https://perma.cc/HS2B-MS9E]. 
 108. Huet, supra note 94; see Rogers, Why Doesn’t Uber Let Women Passengers 
Choose Women Drivers, supra note 107. 
 109. SHETAXIS, http://shetaxis.com [https://perma.cc/8QZV-YAEG].  SheTaxis is a 
livery service that does not employ drivers directly, but joins with existing livery 
companies that employ drivers to provide their female drivers to female passengers 
seeking female drivers. See Hu, supra note 84.  According to SheTaxis, anyone can 
use the company’s services, but only a party including a woman can request a female 
driver; a male passenger could be served by a driver of either sex.  Because SheTaxis 
does not employ its drivers, the company avoids the confines of employment 
discrimination law.  Under some cities’ laws, it would be illegal for a driver to decline 
a fare because of gender. See id. 
 110. Angyal, supra note 91; Rogers, Why Doesn’t Uber Let Women Passengers 
Choose Women Drivers, supra note 107.  Note that at least some of these firms are 
doing considerably better than taxi and livery drivers as a whole.  Women make up 
only fourteen percent of all such drivers in the United States. Paul Merrion, Making 
Inroads: Women Cabbies on the Rise, CHI. BUS. (Sept. 27, 2014), 
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So while Uber claims to be a job creator, it has been a job creator 
almost entirely for men.111 
Safety concerns contribute to the segregation of ride-sharing 
services not only because women avoid driving due to these concerns, 
but also because these concerns—and women’s attempt to address 
them—end up making driving less lucrative for women.  A 
combination of market forces and firm policies mean that female 
drivers suffer financially when they try to mitigate safety concerns.112  
The busiest times of the week for ride-sharing are nights and 
weekends, when drivers can make more money, both because of 
traffic and because of bonuses offered by ride-sharing firms at these 
times.113  But these are also the times when riders are most likely to 
be intoxicated.  Female drivers who opt not to drive during these 
times due to heightened safety concerns thus suffer disproportionate 
financial consequences.  And female drivers who reject male 
passengers who are intoxicated or otherwise pose safety risks likewise 
suffer disproportionate losses.  Some ride-sharing services require a 
90% acceptance rate of riders to be eligible for bonuses, and other 
services count cancellations against drivers in their ratings.114  Uber 
does not let a driver block a certain passenger and Lyft only declines 
to match a driver or passenger if either has given the other a 
sufficiently low rating.115  Neither firm routinely removes passengers 
with low ratings, though if drivers’ ratings fall, they are let go.116 
There is one market for ride-sharing services that is 
overwhelmingly female: driving children.117  Shuddle, which is 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20140927/ISSUE01/309279976/making-
inroads-women-cabbies-on-the-rise [https://perma.cc/TTV3-M792]. 
 111. Huet, supra note 94. 
 112. See Greenfield, supra note 88. 
 113. Huet, supra note 94. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Another gig economy platform dominated by women is Etsy. See generally 
ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/ [https://perma.cc/HT78-DNXZ].  As compared with the 
ride-sharing services, Etsy, a micro-entrepreneur platform that allows sellers to 
peddle their creative wares through the site, is comprised of 88% female sellers.  
Interestingly, while Etsy sellers report higher levels of education than most 
Americans, the average/median income for Etsy sellers is $44,9000, ten percent lower 
than the national average/median.  Although many Etsy sellers use the platform 
merely to supplement more traditional income sources, it is notable that these sellers 
nonetheless remain below average in income. See Jennifer Neeley, Is the Sharing 
Economy Feminist?, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (June 2, 2015), 
http://www.socialmediatoday.com/technology-data/jennifer-neeley/2015-06-02/
sharing-economy-feminist [https://perma.cc/THH2-GV5N]. 
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essentially Uber for children, is comprised of 98% female drivers.118  
There are a number of reasons for the gender inversion.  First, drivers 
must have caregiving experience, which is far more common among 
women.119  Second, the circumstances of the driving—during the 
daytime, without any intoxicated adults—alleviates many of the safety 
concerns for women drivers, and may be less likely to conflict with 
their own caregiving obligations.120  Finally, stereotypical 
expectations of both workers and consumers strongly type this sort of 
intimate caregiving service as women’s work.121 
III.  THE CONSEQUENCES FOR SEX EQUALITY 
The merging of first, second, and third places, and the increasing 
blurring of home and market that comes with the sharing economy 
present challenges for legal regulation.  As legal scholars have long 
recognized (and critiqued), current law is organized largely around 
the distinction between the family and market.122  Particularly when it 
comes to discrimination, very different law applies to the home and 
the market.  In the home, sex discrimination has long not only been 
permitted, but required.123  While required sex discrimination has 
faded,124 discrimination is still permissible.125  On the other hand, 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Mike Isaac, New Ride Services Forge Own Specialized Paths, N.Y. TIMES: 
BITS (June 10, 2015, 6:26 PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/06/10/new-ride-
services-forge-own-specialized-paths/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/Y4RQ-PQ5N]. 
 119. See Greenfield, supra note 88. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See supra notes 45–53 and accompanying text (discussing how identity signals 
skills for certain work). 
 122. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 24, at 1498, 1501. 
 123. We can see this through anti-sodomy laws, see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 578–79 (2003) (striking down sodomy ban), and bans on gay marriage, see 
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (striking down gay marriage ban). 
 124. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2599 (striking down ban on gay marriage); 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578–79 (2003) (striking down anti-sodomy law). 
 125. No law bans private actors from discriminating in the selection of romantic 
partners or children for adoption, and, indeed, the constitutional right to intimate 
association guarantees some sphere of liberty for individuals to exercise 
discriminatory preferences free from government interference in their most intimate 
interactions. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in 
the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307 (2009) (discrimination in 
romance); Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 
624, 634 (1980) (intimate association).  The lack of legal prohibition even extends 
outside the family, to certain domestic workers who labor in the home. See 
Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1231; Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love, 
91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 72–79 (1996).  While Section 1981 bans race discrimination in 
contracting, other prohibitions against discrimination do not apply against domestic 
workers. See id. 
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many forms of sex discrimination are prohibited in the labor 
market,126 in the housing market,127 and in public accommodations.128 
As set forth in the last two Parts, as the sharing economy expands, 
the nature of the transactions and the context in which they occur 
make it particularly likely that sex preferences, and discrimination on 
the basis of such preferences, will flourish.  There is perhaps an irony 
here: as the law has become less accepting of discrimination in the 
home,129 the changing shape of the economy has lead to more 
discrimination in the market.  The sharing economy thus may be seen 
to pose a threat to the sex equality project of the market, that is, the 
goal of ridding market transactions of the salience of sex by 
eliminating sex discrimination, sex segregation, and sex 
stereotyping.130  Before going further, it is worth acknowledging that 
the sex equality project is not monolithic.  There are exceptions to the 
ban on sex discrimination,131 as well as certain contexts in which sex 
discrimination law allows for the recognition of sex differences in the 
market.132  And of course not everyone agrees that sex equality is best 
achieved by making sex less rather than more salient in the market.133  
Despite these facets of sex discrimination law, it is nonetheless 
descriptively accurate to recognize that existing sex discrimination 
law primarily aims to make sex less salient in the market. 
This Part first discusses the threat that the sharing economy poses 
to the legal sex equality project, and also considers whether the 
sharing economy poses any reason for reconsidering the equality 
project.  This Part next discusses what role there is for law to 
                                                                                                                 
 126. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012). 
 127. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012). 
 128. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
 129. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
 130. See Cary Franklin, The Anti-Stereotyping Principle in Constitutional Sex 
Discrimination Law, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 106–108 (2010); Schultz, supra note 11, at 
996. 
 131. I discuss the intimacy-based exceptions in Part III.B.3.  For an interesting 
critique of how antidiscrimination law, through its exceptions, operates both to 
prohibit and to approve certain forms of sex discrimination, see Robert Post, 
Prejudicial Appearances: The Logic of American Antidiscrimination Law, 88 CAL. L. 
REV. 1 (2000). 
 132. See Cal. Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 285 (1987) 
(holding that Title VII does not preempt a state law that mandates benefits for 
pregnant workers and not for non-pregnant workers because “Congress intended the 
[Pregnancy Discrimination Act] to be a floor beneath which pregnancy disability 
benefits may not drop—not a ceiling above which they may not rise”). 
 133. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 996 (discussing disagreement among feminists as 
to whether sex equality is best achieved by the law recognizing sex differences when 
it comes to pregnancy). 
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intervene.  It addresses the unsettled nature of current law, market 
responses in the face of this uncertainty, and the challenges that the 
sharing economy poses for the sex equality project even if current 
antidiscrimination law were to be extended to the sharing economy, 
which calls into question the transformative potential of 
antidiscrimination law there. 
A. Promise or Threat? 
As we can see, sex preferences have flourished in the sharing 
economy.  Importantly, these preferences manifest not only in subtle 
discrimination and unconscious biases, but overt discrimination and 
segregation.  This suggests not only that norms are not strong enough 
to constrain sex discrimination in these settings, but that norms are 
sufficiently weak that express sex preferences and even segregation 
are considered acceptable and perhaps even desirable (at least by 
substantial numbers of persons). 
Some might argue that the sharing economy holds promise in terms 
of rethinking the sex equality project.  As an initial matter, the 
sharing economy may lead us to question the boundaries around the 
home and the market as they traditionally have been conceived.  This 
holds the promise of breaking down these boundaries that feminist 
legal scholars have typically found troubling, as these boundaries 
have often been used to deny protection to women and women’s 
work.134  However, most feminist scholars have been concerned not 
simply with shifting the boundaries, but with extending the 
protections of the public sphere to the private sphere.135  If the 
sharing economy prompts recognition of the need to extend more 
market protections to the home, this would be consistent with the 
arguments of many sex equality scholars.136  If, instead, the sharing 
economy extends exceptions to antidiscrimination protections for 
market activity because they are viewed as sufficiently private or 
intimate, this would present a challenge to the sex equality project as 
it has primarily been conceived. 
This challenge might be supported with a range of arguments.  
First, what we already see happening in the sharing economy strongly 
suggests that some people—especially women—want the freedom to 
exercise sex preferences.  Despite the sex equality project, there is 
                                                                                                                 
 134. See Olsen, supra note 24, at 1518–20; Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1174–75; 
Silbaugh, supra note 125, at 22–26. 
 135. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.  
 136. See supra note 134 and accompanying text. 
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still a strong sense that in both life137 and law,138 sex preferences in 
intimate spaces within the market, housing, and public 
accommodations are acceptable.  Eliminating these options then may 
actually reduce women’s welfare.  And there may be trade-offs 
between intimacy and equality.  As one driver explained, she 
preferred working for an all-female taxi service because she was able 
to engage in more intimate transactions with female passengers.139  
Second, an alternative regime might be justified if the circumstances 
of certain market transactions are sufficiently different that they 
justify a different approach to legal regulation.  In fact, there might be 
concern that if we regulate sharing-economy activities too much like 
those of the traditional economy that the law will infringe too much 
on spaces where we currently enjoy freedom from regulation.140  
Finally, one might argue that allowing alternative regulatory regimes 
to exist in the market would provide the benefit of affording buyers 
and sellers the opportunity to opt into the regulatory regime that best 
matched their own preference.141 
                                                                                                                 
 137. See Case, Changing Room?, supra note 103 (bathrooms); Allen, supra note 65 
(massage); Barry Gewen, Sports and Sexual Segregation, N.Y. TIMES: ARTSBEAT 
(June 4, 2008), http://artsbeat.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/sports-and-sexual-
segregation/?_r=0l [https://perma.cc/8QS7-X9TJ] (athletics); Lewin, supra note 50. 
 138. Title VII’s BFOQ exception applies to sex but not race. See infra notes 204–10 
and accompanying text for more on the BFOQ exception.  Section 1981 bans race but 
not sex discrimination in contracting. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2012).  And of course 
strict scrutiny applies to race discrimination under the Constitution, while only 
intermediate scrutiny applies to sex. Compare City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson, 488 
U.S. 469, 494 (1989) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion) (applying strict scrutiny to race 
classifications), with Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) 
(applying intermediate scrutiny to sex classifications). 
 139. See Hu, supra note 84. 
 140. I am not arguing specifically that a constitutional right to intimate association 
applies in these cases, but rather that as a matter of practice these spaces are 
currently subject to less regulation. 
 141. See Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in 
the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116 (2015), 
https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/page/self-regulation-and-innovation-peer-peer-
sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/643J-7RAG] (arguing for different regulatory 
regimes for the sharing and traditional economies). But see Edith Ramirez, Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Keynote Remarks at the 42nd Annual Conference on International 
Antitrust Law and Policy, Fordham Law School (Oct. 2, 2015), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/810851/151002fordham
remarks.pdf [https://perma.cc/S87N-M9TX] (arguing to “avoid creating two distinct 
regulatory tracks—with one set of rules for the older, incumbents businesses and a 
different set of rules for the new entrants they now increasingly compete against”). 
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We have rejected each of these arguments in the traditional 
economy.142  Is there a reason to accept them in the sharing 
economy?  Believers in the sex equality project would argue no.143  
While a lack of regulation would increase choice for some, it would 
decrease choice for others.  We can see this in the context of the 
traditional economy when it comes to male gynecologists, where the 
preference for female gynecologists has seriously hindered men’s 
ability to pursue this career path.144  And of course, these sex 
preferences are grounded in sex-based stereotypes.  Allowing sex-
based stereotypes to have a strong hold in the market runs exactly 
contrary to the sex equality project, which is premised significantly in 
an anti-stereotyping principle—that is, that we should not classify on 
the basis of assumptions about how a man or a woman will behave 
simply because of sex.145 
Under this anti-stereotyping approach, there may be some tension 
between short-term and long-term utility.  The anti-stereotyping 
approach is premised in the notion that restricting reliance on sex will 
make sex less salient over time, thereby reducing the need to rely on 
sex in the future.146  There is reason to believe that sex preferences 
                                                                                                                 
 142. With the exception of the intimacy exceptions discussed infra Part III.B.3, 
which, at least in the traditional economy, have been recognized as quite narrow and 
have been applied only rarely. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2002) (“The [Equal 
Employment Opportunity] Commission believes that the bona fide occupational 
qualification exception as to sex [discrimination] should be interpreted narrowly.”).  
By contrast, recognizing a similar approach in the sharing economy would so greatly 
expand the recognition of such exceptions such that the difference would be one in 
kind, not just degree. 
 143. Scholars have addressed these arguments in the context of other intimate 
work situations and have made a persuasive case for rejecting them. See Deborah A. 
Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical 
Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 329–33 
(1985) (questioning arguments supporting the BFOQ grounded in customer sex 
preferences but stopping short of arguing for the elimination of the BFOQ 
exception); Amy Kapczynski, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257, 1259 (2003) (arguing that there is no justification for the 
privacy-based BFOQ exception grounded in customer sex preferences). 
 144. See Lewin, supra note 50 (discussing how women’s preference for female 
gynecologists has limited men’s future in the field).  The status of the BFOQ 
exception as it applies to gynecologists is not clear. See Veleanu v. Beth Isr. Med. 
Ctr., No. 98 Civ. 7455, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13948, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2000) 
(holding that satisfying patient’s request for female gynecologist does not constitute 
unlawful discrimination without answering whether BFOQ applies such that the 
employer itself would be barred from considering sex); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., 
No. Civ. 80–1374–W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) (applying BFOQ to 
labor and delivery nurse). 
 145. See Franklin, supra note 130, at 106. 
 146. Id. at 84–85. 
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are not fixed but malleable.  For example, while women currently 
prefer female gynecologists, this preference arose only relatively 
recently.147  Until just a few decades ago, when gynecology was a male 
profession, women saw male gynecologists without complaint.148  This 
shift in preference for female gynecologists was, of course, prompted 
largely by Title VII’s equal employment opportunity mandate, which 
opened up the medical profession to women.149  Thus, there is reason 
to believe that consumer preferences can be responsive to the force of 
law. 
And there is yet another reason why law should not simply accede 
to sex preferences in the name of worker and customer autonomy.  
Sex preferences cannot be viewed as entirely exogenous or fully 
formed before workers and customers enter the market.150  Rather, 
sharing-economy firms play a role in shaping preferences.  Therefore, 
it is not clear whether satisfying these preferences can even be seen to 
further the unmanipulated interests of workers and customers. 
Some firms expressly suggest sex discrimination as a way to satisfy 
preferences of privacy, comfort, and safety.151  Even when such firms 
do not expressly advocate sex discrimination, they may reinforce 
conscious and unconscious discriminatory preferences.  TaskRabbit’s 
homepage, for example, suggests the different tasks for which you can 
“Hire [a tasker] for a Range of Needs Around Your Home.”152  For 
the task of “Cleaning” (“We’ll make your home sparkle!”), we see an 
image of a (white) female tasker cleaning a kitchen, with a woman 
(presumably the client) holding a baby in the background 
(representing the female labor she is replacing).153  For the task of 
“Moving Help,” we see an image of a (black) man moving boxes.154  
These images prime us for the identity of the proper person for each 
job.  For the task of “Handyman,” (“Taskers can help with handyman 
tasks around your home.”), TaskRabbit goes further, making it 
explicit that it is men who should complete these tasks.155  If 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See Lewin, supra note 50. 
 148. See id. 
 149. See Schultz, supra note 11, at 1006–09. 
 150. See Allen, supra note 65 (noting that one woman believed she had no 
preference for either a male or female masseuse until realizing that she was able to 
relax more with a female masseuse). 
 151. See supra Part II.B. 
 152. See TASKRABBIT, supra note 17. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
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“Handyman” was not clear enough, we see an image of a (white) man 
with his tools.156 
As Professor Vicki Schultz has made clear in the case of 
employees, individuals do not come to the workplace with fully 
formed preferences about work.157  Rather, work experiences 
themselves, which are largely determined by the employer, shape 
workers’ expectations and preferences.158  This is no less true for 
consumers, whose expectations and preferences are not exclusively 
formed before entering the market for a transaction.  Rather, the 
market can help to shape expectations and preferences for the 
provision of intimate services.159  To the extent that firms cultivate 
and reinforce consumers’ discriminatory preferences, this helps to 
shape preferences by legitimating rather than disrupting such 
preferences, particularly by creating the environment in which 
intimate services are delivered.160  If consumers have their 
preferences accommodated, this reinforces their preexisting view that 
this is the only acceptable way these services may be delivered.161 
Moreover, when it comes to safety, relying on sex preferences 
sidesteps the underlying issue, which is a safety problem.  The 
solution then is not to avoid the safety issues with sex segregation 
(which puts the burden on the potential victim of the danger), but to 
address the underlying safety concerns (which puts the burden on 
those who pose the safety risks and the institutions responsible for 
them).162  Relying on sex segregation to address safety problems in 
                                                                                                                 
 156. Id. 
 157. See Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About Women and Work: Judicial 
Interpretations of Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII Cases Raising the 
Lack of Interest Argument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749, 1815 (1990) (“[W]omen’s work 
preferences are formed, created, and recreated in response to changing work 
conditions.”). 
 158. Id. at 1816 (describing the variety of mechanisms employers use to “structure 
opportunities and incentives and maintain work cultures and relations so as to 
disempower most women from aspiring to and succeeding in traditionally male 
jobs”). 
 159. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1193–96.  Other scholars have recognized 
the role of the law in shaping even our most intimate preferences. See Emens, supra 
note 125, at 1366–74, for a discussion of the law’s role in structuring, as she terms it, 
“the accidents of sex and love”—the likelihood of dating and marrying people from 
particular identity groups. 
 160. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1193–96. 
 161. See id. 
 162. We can see this recognition by the dissent in the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).  There, the dissent recognized that the 
real problem in the prison was its “barbaric and inhumane” conditions—“conditions 
so bad that state officials have conceded they violate the Constitution.” Id. at 342.  
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ride-sharing services is reminiscent of single-sex transit systems such 
as women-only buses and subway cars in place abroad, including in 
Egypt, Iran, and Pakistan.163  This approach is entirely out of step 
with the U.S. anti-stereotyping approach to sex discrimination.164 
A final problem with sex-based classifications is that they assume a 
neat binary when it comes to sex.  In an era when Caitlyn Jenner is 
gracing magazine covers and the public is increasingly coming to 
accept transgenderism,165 this is an especially problematic solution.  
Transgender individuals have already troubled our sex-segregated 
spaces, such as bathrooms and athletic facilities.166  A regime 
premised on sex is likely to raise significant classification problems for 
transgender individuals and concerns about who is a “real” woman.167  
And substantial reliance on sex-based classifications might pose a 
challenge to transgenderism, which relies on some notion of fluidity 
across the sexes.168 
                                                                                                                 
The response should have been to improve these conditions rather than to ban 
women from working in them. 
 163. See Angyal, supra note 91; Holly Kearl, Actually, No: Women-Only 
Transportation Won’t End Harassment, TAKEPART, http://www.takepart.com/article/
2015/08/31/women-only-public-transportation [https://perma.cc/R3XN-8YT7] (noting 
that countries with women-only bus services include Bangladesh, Guatemala, India, 
Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Thailand, and the United Arab Emirates, and that 
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Iran, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Nepal, and Russia). 
 164. See supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text. 
 165. See Buzz Bissinger, Caitlyn Jenner: The Full Story, VANITY FAIR (June 25, 
2015), http://www.vanityfair.com/hollywood/2015/06/caitlyn-jenner-bruce-cover-
annie-leibovitz [https://perma.cc/5FYH-BMW2] (cover photo of Jenner done by 
Annie Leibowitz). 
 166. See Schmidt, supra note 103, at 161–62.  For a fascinating discussion of these 
issues, see Michelle Goldberg, What Is a Woman?, NEW YORKER (Aug. 4, 2014), 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/08/04/woman-2 [https://perma.cc/5QNC-
ZUCR]. 
 167. Goldberg, supra note 166. 
 168. One could argue that transgenderism actually accepts and reinforces the sex 
binary.  It is premised on the notion that there are two sexes and that a person 
identifies as either one or the other.  If someone identifies with the sex not of her 
birth, she may need to switch sex.  There are other sex and gender identity positions 
that blur the line far more, such as persons who refuse to identify as either male or 
female, or even persons who feel no compunction to have their gender performance 
match their sex. See generally Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual 
Orientation, supra note 5 (1995) (discussing the distinction between sex and gender, 
and the legal implications for those whose gender does not match their sex); Elinor 
Burkett, What Makes a Woman?, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/07/opinion/sunday/what-makes-a-woman.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/Y43C-MYBK] (highlighting and critiquing that transgender 
individuals often adopt very stereotypical performances of female gender). 
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Finally, believers in the sex equality project might be concerned 
that the sheer size of the sharing economy poses too great of a threat 
to the sex equality project were it to go unregulated by 
antidiscrimination law.  If antidiscrimination law does not apply to the 
bulk of sharing-economy transactions, this creates a large and 
expanding segment of market activity that is not subject to the 
equality norms that typically govern work, housing, and much activity 
in third spaces.  This would affect not only the sharing economy, but 
could, by affecting the norms of sex equality in the market, 
undermine the role of antidiscrimination law in transforming gender 
relations even within the traditional economy. 
B. What Role for Law? 
This Subpart addresses what role the law can play in addressing the 
salience of sex in the sharing economy.  It is not clear whether current 
antidiscrimination and other protective law applies to the sharing 
economy.  This Subpart does not seek to answer this question,169 but 
briefly sets forth the terms of the uncertainty.  The primary aim of 
this Subpart is to highlight how even if this law does apply, there are 
reasons to believe that it will not be as effective or transformative as it 
has been in the traditional economy.  The sharing economy thus poses 
unique challenges for the goals of sex equality.  This Subpart begins 
with a discussion of current law and market responses, then turns to 
the challenges that the sharing economy presents to 
antidiscrimination law, and concludes with a few suggestions for new 
legal approaches to address these challenges. 
1. Current Law 
The first set of laws that would be relevant to discrimination in the 
sharing economy is antidiscrimination law in the employment, 
housing, and public accommodations contexts.  These laws ban sex 
discrimination.170  But it is not clear whether these laws apply to 
                                                                                                                 
 169. Other scholars have taken on this task. See, e.g., Benjamin Means & Joseph 
Seiner, Navigating the Uber Economy, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1511 (2016), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2663350 [https://perma.cc/V88C-
9JWY]; Rogers, supra note 7, at 95. 
 170. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (federal employment discrimination law); 42 
U.S.C. §§ 3601–3631 (2012) (federal housing discrimination law); 42 U.S.C. § 2000a 
(2012) (federal public accommodations law).  Federal public accommodations law 
does not bar sex discrimination, but most state laws do. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. 
§ 18.80.200 (West 2016); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1442 (West 2012); 2015 Cal. 
Legis. Serv. Ch. 282 (S.B. 600) (West 2015); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-601 
(West 2016); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64 (West 2016). 
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sharing-economy firms.171  As for employment discrimination law, 
many sharing-economy firms have argued that their workers are 
independent contractors and not employees, and thus that they are 
not covered under these laws.172  Litigation is ongoing,173 and scholars 
have disagreed on the correct answer.174 
As for the application of housing discrimination law and public 
accommodations law, sharing-economy firms have likewise claimed 
that these laws do not apply to them because they are not entities that 
are regulated under the law.175  Their status under current law is not 
clear.176  Even if these laws do not cover sharing-economy firms, there 
is a separate question of whether individuals who open their homes or 
cars or other spaces to customers are covered.  But even if individuals 
are covered, this would have less of an impact than regulating the 
firms themselves, as firms rather than individuals are the entities with 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 95. 
 172. See Means & Seiner, supra note 169, at 2–3; Rogers, supra note 7, at 98–99.  
Note that 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which bans race discrimination in contracting, should 
operate to prohibit race discrimination, regardless of worker status. 
 173. See, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-03826 EMC (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 11, 2015); Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., No. 13-cv-04065-VC (N.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2015). 
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 175. See ADA and FHA Compliance, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/
article/898/ada-and-fha-compliance [https://perma.cc/Y9LZ-ZGAE] (discussing that 
it is important for U.S. hosts, and not Airbnb, to understand their responsibilities 
under the Fair Housing Act). 
 176. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 95. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b) (2012) 
(defining “place of public accommodation” to include, for example, hotels and 
motels, restaurants, and theaters, but not transportation companies), with 49 C.F.R. 
§ 37.29 (1991) (“Providers of taxi service are subject to the requirements of [the 
transportation and related provisions of Titles II and III of the ADA].”), and D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 2-1401.02(24) (West 2016) (defining “place of public accommodation” 
to include “all public conveyances”).  Disability-rights organizations have argued that 
Uber is a taxi service under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and 
therefore must make reasonable accommodations for disabled passengers. See 
Complaint for Violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101, 
the California Unruh Civil Rights Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52, and the California 
Disabled Persons Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 54–54.3, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., Case No 3:14-cv-4086, 2014 WL 4628579, at *14–20 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 9, 2014).  The Justice Department has sided with the plaintiffs.  Statement of 
Interest of the United States of America, Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v. Uber 
Techs., Inc., Case No 3:14-cv-4086, *5 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 23, 2014). 
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the incentives and the ability to implement effective policies to 
address the concerns raised above.177 
The second set of laws that would be relevant here are laws related 
to safety.  For safety issues that rise to a serious enough level, criminal 
law could deter and punish, and tort law could deter and compensate.  
But because the institutional entity—the firm—rather than the 
individual has a much greater ability to control and prevent harms 
and to compensate victims, effective use of these areas of law would 
turn on institutional liability.178  Sharing-economy firms themselves 
might be negligent with regard to allowing unsafe users to use their 
services, but likely only if they knew or should have known of the 
dangers.179  For this reason, effective safety policies would be more 
likely to be forthcoming from sharing-economy firms if they faced 
vicarious liability for the torts of their workers.180  Vicarious liability 
will turn on whether these workers are in fact employees, which again 
is contested.181 
Finally, there are regulations aimed at protecting the safety of 
workers and consumers.182  But again, sharing-economy firms claim 
that these laws do not apply to them because they are not the type of 
entities that are covered by such laws.183  These issues have yet to be 
resolved.184 
                                                                                                                 
 177. Individuals are far less likely to be sued, and thus they will not feel as much 
pressure to comply with any applicable law.  And they do not have the resources or 
the control to ascertain and implement effective safety and antidiscrimination 
measures. 
 178. See Reinier H. Kraakman, Vicarious and Corporate Civil Liability, in TORT 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 134, 134–36 (Michael Faure ed., 2009) 
 179. See Kat Greene, Airbnb Renter Says Hosts Were Spying with Hidden 
Camera, LAW360 (Dec. 15, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/737996/airbnb-
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against Airbnb). 
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Employees? The Growing Labor Crisis in the “Sharing Economy”, BROWN POL. 
REV. (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2015/10/are-uber-drivers-
employees-the-growing-labor-crisis-in-the-sharing-economy/ [https://perma.cc/B57J-
5TV9]. 
 182. See, e.g., Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651–678 (2012); 
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141–197, 142(1) (2012). 
 183. See Stemler, supra note 180, at 57. 
 184. See sources cited supra note 176.  In a decision that applies only to the 
individual employee claimant, the California Labor Commissioner’s Office concluded 
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2. Market Responses 
Whether due to market pressure or worker pressure,185 sharing-
economy firms have responded to some discrimination and safety 
concerns in ways that are not required by law.  But the responses 
have been inadequate.  Some firms prohibit posting material that 
“promotes discrimination, bigotry, racism, hatred, harassment or 
harm,” and will engage in some monitoring to help enforce the 
policy.186  But firms do not engage in nearly enough monitoring to 
ensure that users do not discriminate, not only in the posting of 
material, but in the remainder of their transactions.187   And of course 
at least some of these firms are playing a role in cultivating 
discrimination, either specifically by relying on sex discriminatory 
mechanisms, or by activating discriminatory preferences.188 
Sharing-economy firms have taken action in response to safety 
concerns, but these responses too have been inadequate.  For 
example, Uber and other ridesharing services vet their drivers by 
relying on private firms that conduct criminal background checks.189  
But the firms have been criticized for incomplete background checks 
after finding drivers with criminal histories.190  And this falls short of 
                                                                                                                 
that an Uber driver was an employee, not an independent contractor. See Berwick v. 
Uber Techs., Inc., Case No. 11-46739 EK (June 3, 2015), http://www.scribd.com/
doc/268911290/Uber-vs-Berwick [https://perma.cc/2MJ8-XATD].  Uber has appealed 
this decision. See Uber Techs. v. Berwick, Case No. CGC-15-546378 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 
June 16, 2015), http://www.scribd.com/doc/268911290/Uber-vs-Berwick. 
 185. See Rogers, supra note 7, at 96–97, 99 (citing associations of Uber drivers and 
how work stoppage changed Uber behavior). 
 186. Harman, supra note 56.  In one instance, AirBnB removed a listing that 
banned gay couples. Nick Duffy, Accommodation Website Airbnb Removes Listing 
That Banned Gay Couples, PINKNEWS (Nov. 23, 2014), http://www.pinknews.co.uk/
2014/11/23/accomodation-website-airbnb-removes-listing-that-banned-gay-couples/ 
[https://perma.cc/QK4A-ZY68].  AirBnB just rolled out new measures to combat 
discrimination, but it is too soon to assess their efficacy.  See Katie Benner, AirBnB 
Adopts Rules to Fight Discrimination by Its Hosts, N.Y. TIMES, at A1 (Sept. 9, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/technology/airbnb-anti-discrimination-rules.html 
[https://perma.cc/Z6NL-ZVXQ] (reporting that the company would require rental 
hosts to agree to a “community commitment” to comply with a new 
nondiscrimination policy and would try to reduce reliance on user photographs). 
 187. Lyft doesn’t track users’ race or gender, but they monitor drivers to make sure 
they aren’t denying a large number of requests to a particular group.  If so, this might 
lead to an investigation of the driver. Harman, supra note 56; Wortham, supra note 
58.  However, most firms do not engage in any sort of comprehensive monitoring and 
auditing that could help to reduce discrimination. 
 188. See supra notes 105–121 and accompanying text. 
 189. See Perman, supra note 54. 
 190. See id.; Carmel DeAmicis, Exclusive: Uber Driver Accused of Assault Had 
Done Prison Time for a Felony, Passed Background Check Anyways, PANDO (Jan. 6, 
2014), https://pando.com/2014/01/06/exclusive-uber-driver-accused-of-assault-passed-
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the measures required in many cities to ensure the safety of taxi 
drivers: finger-printing to check their status on federal databases of 
violent offenders and drug-testing.191  Uber does not provide an 
emergency number for passengers who feel threatened by drivers; the 
only way to contact the firm is by email.192  Nor has the company 
removed from its system passengers who have been reported to 
sexually harass drivers.193  In December 2014, Uber updated its safety 
policy, and began charging a safety surcharge to all rides.194  But 
assaults have continued even after the revamp.195 
AirBnB has tried to increase consumer and host protections by 
doing more to verify the personal aspects of the transaction.  The firm 
has added protections to ensure that online profiles match real-life 
identities.196  The “Verified ID” function matches users’ online 
identities (for example, through existing AirBnB reviews or 
Facebook) and offline documentation, such as scanning official 
identification, like a driver’s license.197  But the scheme is not yet 
obligatory unless booking last minute.198 
Note that market pressures may push at least some firms towards 
classifying their workers as employees and bringing them within the 
dictates of employment law.  While working with independent 
contractors allows firms to avoid the minimum wage and other 
expensive protections that come along with employment status, it 
                                                                                                                 
zero-tolerance-background-check-despite-criminal-history/ [https://perma.cc/79B3-
MC23]. 
 191. See Perman, supra note 54. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See Rogers, supra note 7. 
 194. See Perman, supra note 54 (explaining that the fee goes toward background 
checks, vehicle screenings, driver education, and the development of additional safety 
features); Uber’s ‘Safe Ride Fee’ Becomes ‘Booking Fee’ After $25M Settlement 
over Rider Safety, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2016/apr/07/uber-driver-background-check-lawsuit-passenger-safety-
california [https://perma.cc/8RUD-L6NX]. 
 195. See Velasco, supra note 88. 
 196. Paul Brady, Is Airbnb Safe? Seven Tips for First-Time Renters, CONDE NAST 
TRAVELER (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.cntraveler.com/stories/2014-01-14/six-tips-for-
first-time-airbnb-renters [https://perma.cc/5ZBH-WW3N].  See Strahilevitz, supra 
note 60, at 1705, for discussion on how anonymity in the context of driving leads to 
worse behavior. 
 197. What Is Verified ID?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/450/what-
is-verified-id [https://perma.cc/5X7U-ENUS]. 
 198. I’m a Host. What Are Some Safety Tips I Can Follow?, AIRBNB, 
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/231/i-m-a-host—what-are-some-safety-tips-i-can-
follow [https://perma.cc/3DXU-HGRB]; I’m a Guest. What Are Some Safety Tips I 
Can Follow?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/241/i-m-a-guest—what-
are-some-safety-tips-i-can-follow [https://perma.cc/9KQ6-FJG5]. 
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comes at a cost.  The demise of at least one sharing-economy firm, 
Homejoy, a home cleaning service, has been attributed to the lack of 
control they exercised over their workers, leading to inferior service 
and dissatisfied customers.199  A few sharing-economy firms have 
voluntarily shifted their workers from independent contractors to 
employees because they deemed control over their workers necessary 
for the success of their business.200  While this voluntary 
reclassification is not likely to be adopted by most firms, these 
examples reveal at least some counter-pressure from the market that 
would limit independent contracting even in the sharing economy. 
3. Challenges for Law 
Even if antidiscrimination law does apply to the sharing economy, 
either under current doctrine or by expansion of the law to new types 
of working relationships, such as “dependent contractors,”201 it will 
still not address all of the manifestations of the salience of sex in the 
sharing economy.  This is for a number of reasons related to the 
nature of transactions in the sharing economy.  First, intimacy 
exceptions to antidiscrimination law will tend to be more relevant in 
the sharing economy, as will the lack of protection against customer 
discrimination.202  Second, and perhaps even more importantly 
(because these intimacy exceptions could be eliminated, at least in 
                                                                                                                 
 199. See Ellen Huet, What Really Killed Homejoy?  It Just Couldn’t Hold on to Its 
Customers, FORBES (July 23, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/23/
what-really-killed-homejoy-it-couldnt-hold-onto-its-customers [https://perma.cc/WY
4S-QLU6]. 
 200. See Ellen Huet, The Price Of Control: On-Demand Shipping Service Shyp 
Converts Its Couriers to Employees, FORBES (July 1, 2015), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/ellenhuet/2015/07/01/on-demand-shipping-service-shyp-converts-its-couriers-to-
employees/ [https://perma.cc/4SN7-G7X4].  On the general question of the firm’s 
make/buy decision, see the seminal Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 
ECONOMICA 386 (1937). 
 201. See Lauren Weber, What If There Were a New Type of Worker? Dependent 
Contractor, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/what-if-there-
were-a-new-type-of-worker-dependent-contractor-1422405831 
[https://perma.cc/YJ9Q-F7QJ]. 
 202. Some of the inadequacy of law here would apply equally to the traditional 
economy.  Occupational segregation has proven quite resistant to legal challenge. See 
EEOC v. Sears, 839 F.2d 302, 320–21 (1988) (crediting the lack of interest defense to 
reject Title VII sex discrimination claim based in occupational segregation); Schultz, 
supra note 11, at 1048–66, 1109 (critiquing the lack of interest defense).  Even though 
some sharing-economy firm policies (e.g., bonuses for driving at night or for 
acceptance rates) might be subject to disparate impact challenges, these are 
notoriously difficult to win. See Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a 
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 735, 738–40 (2006) (documenting low success rates 
of disparate impact claims). 
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theory), even when antidiscrimination law applies, structural features 
of the sharing economy make antidiscrimination law less effective and 
reduce the law’s potential to have the transformative effect that it has 
had in the traditional economy.  These challenges that the sharing 
economy poses to sex discrimination law are discussed in turn. 
First, exceptions to and gaps in antidiscrimination law will be 
particularly likely to be relevant to sharing-economy transactions.  
Employment discrimination law contains a “bona fide occupational 
qualification” (BFOQ) exception to certain intimate work 
circumstances.203  Employers relying on sex segregation to address 
safety concerns in settings of intense intimacy is not unheard of in 
U.S. law.  One of the seminal early Title VII sex discrimination cases, 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, was decided precisely on this ground.204  In 
that case, the Court held that an employer could rely on sex as a 
qualification for the position of correctional officer because the 
dangers that women faced made them unfit for the job.205  Dothard 
may be distinguished, as prisons are already premised on the sex 
segregation of prisoners.206  And a later decision by the Court 
rejected a BFOQ defense that turned on the argument that sex 
discrimination was necessary to protect women workers.207  But the 
possibility for exceptions based on intimacy remains, not only due to 
safety concerns, but also due to interests in privacy208 and sexual 
titillation.209 
                                                                                                                 
 203. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(e)(1) (2012); Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1190. 
 204. 433 U.S. 321, 334-36 (1977). 
 205. Id. at 335 (“A woman’s relative ability to maintain order in a male, maximum 
security, unclassified penitentiary of the type Alabama now runs could be directly 
reduced by her womanhood.  There is a basis in fact for expecting that sex offenders 
who have criminally assaulted women in the past would be moved to do so again if 
access to women were established within the prison.  There would also be a real risk 
that other inmates, deprived of a normal heterosexual environment, would assault 
women guards because they were women.”). 
 206. See David S. Cohen, Keeping Men “Men” and Women Down: Sex 
Segregation, Anti-Essentialism, and Masculinity, 25 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 509, 514 
(2010) (citing state statutes). 
 207. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187 (1991) (rejecting 
BFOQ defense in case where employer banned fertile female employees from 
working with chemicals that presented safety risks to fetuses). 
 208. At their most substantial, these privacy interests arise in contexts where 
female customers express preferences for female workers so as to avoid genital 
exposure to male workers.  Title VII has drawn the line in interpreting the BFOQ 
exception to sex discrimination based in customer privacy preferences here.  
Compare Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410 (N.D. Ill. 1984) 
(attendants responsible for cleaning bathrooms), Brooks v. ACF Indus. Inc., 537 F. 
Supp. 1122 (S.D. W. Va. 1982) (janitor responsible for cleaning bathrooms), EEOC v. 
Mercy Health Ctr., No. Civ. 80–1374–W, 1982 WL 3108 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982) 
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Intimacy exceptions also exist under fair housing law.  First, federal 
housing law contains a so-called “Mrs. Murphy” exception, which 
exempts from antidiscrimination mandates dwellings intended to be 
occupied by four or fewer families if the owner lives in one of the 
units.210  Note, however, that even a Mrs. Murphy landlord must still 
comply with fair housing law’s ban on posting discriminatory 
advertisements.211  Second, as discussed above, at least one federal 
appellate court has held that the right to intimate association protects 
roommate relationships such that antidiscrimination law cannot 
intervene.212 
Antidiscrimination law also lacks protection against customer 
discrimination,213 which is particularly likely to arise in the sharing 
economy given that it is service oriented, and that the intimacy of the 
transactions tends to stoke discriminatory preferences.  Not only does 
antidiscrimination law contain no ban on customer discrimination per 
se, but it also does little to stand in the way of employers cultivating 
and reinforcing discriminatory preferences in customers.214 
Second, structural features of the sharing economy will tend to 
make antidiscrimination law less effective there.  One of the primary 
benefits for which employment discrimination law has been justly 
celebrated is providing a place of integration.215  Professor Cynthia 
                                                                                                                 
(labor and delivery nurse), and Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. 
Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982) (same), with Olsen v. 
Marriott Int’l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999) (denying BFOQ for massage 
therapist), EEOC v. Sedita, 816 F. Supp. 1291 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (denying BFOQ for 
health club instructors), and EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. 301 (W.D. Mo. 1996) 
(denying BFOQ for weight-loss center counselors). 
 209. See Wilson v. Sw. Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). See generally 
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible 
Sex Discrimination, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 147 (discussing and explaining the more 
lenient approach to privacy preferences than titillation preferences). 
 210. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2012). 
 211. See id. § 3603(c). 
 212. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text.  As discussed above, it is not 
clear whether this decision would apply to shared dwellings in the sharing-economy 
context because those relationships are not as intimate due to their shorter duration. 
 213. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1189–91; Katharine T. Bartlett & G. Mitu 
Gulati, Discrimination by Customers, 102 IOWA L. REV. 223 (2016)  Because 42 
U.S.C. § 1981 bans race discrimination in contracting, it would apply to customer 
discrimination, but it has never been deployed this way. See IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE 
PREJUDICE: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION 
127–36 (2001) (discussing how § 1981 could apply to customer discrimination); 
Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 213, at 4 n.8. 
 214. See supra notes 159–60 and accompanying text. 
 215. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and 
the Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 1, 8 (2000). 
1066 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLIII 
Estlund has argued that the application of antidiscrimination 
mandates in the workplace has created a space where coworkers can 
come together in a more integrated setting than they would otherwise 
find in their neighborhoods, schools, or other third places of public 
accommodation.216  Relying on the contact hypothesis, Estlund argues 
that this means that employment discrimination law plays a critical 
role in improving race relations and race equality norms.217 
While Estlund’s focus is on race, we can expand her argument to 
gender.  One might think that men and women already have plenty of 
contact in the home and in a variety of third places such as bars.  But 
what the workplace and employment discrimination law bring are an 
opportunity for men and women to interact as coworkers in settings 
where norms of equality prevail, allowing the interaction to change 
the nature of gender relations in a way that does not occur in other 
settings.  We can see the role that law has played in changing norms 
of male-female interaction quite clearly in the context of sexual 
harassment.218 
Critically, however, employment discrimination law’s role in 
changing these norms turns not only on the law itself, but also on the 
structural features of the workplace in which the law operates.  Part 
of the mechanism by which antidiscrimination law changes norms is 
through the presence of coworkers and the contact that they have 
with each other.219  Building relationships in a context of equality 
helps to improve race and gender relations.  But in the sharing 
economy, even if the law applies, there is no workplace and no 
coworkers.  What is left is the relationship between the seller and the 
buyer.  There is reason to believe that the application of 
antidiscrimination law in this type of setting will not have such a 
beneficial effect on norms.  In such settings, interactions between 
buyers and sellers take place in a context of hierarchy, and are not as 
regular as those of the daily interactions between coworkers.220 
The lack of coworkers may also undermine the enforcement of 
antidiscrimination law.221  As an initial matter, given the reliance on 
                                                                                                                 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 19. 
 218. See Nadler & Bilz, supra note 13, at 101. 
 219. See Estlund, supra note 215, at 19. 
 220. See id. at 25 (describing the conditions in which the contact hypothesis is 
likely to hold true, including conditions of regular interaction and non-hierarchy). 
 221. See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, Towards a Law of Coworkers, 68 ALA. L. 
REV. 605 (2017) (arguing that coworkers are essential to work law and work life, 
including through aiding in the enforcement of work law). 
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comparators as the primary mechanism for proving discrimination,222 
it is unclear how discrimination would even be established in many 
cases in the sharing economy.  Moreover, because antidiscrimination 
law turns largely on private rights of enforcement, workers’ legal 
consciousness must be raised for a legal violation to be recognized 
and a claim to be made in the first instance.223  With this 
understanding of the enforcement of employment discrimination law, 
coworkers become a critical part of the enforcement mechanism. 
First, the support that coworkers provide raises legal 
consciousness.  “[T]he presence of close work friends . . . is a strong 
and consistent predictor of [legal] mobilization.”224  Because 
coworkers have often undergone similar experiences, they are thus 
well placed to confirm a worker’s sense of a violation, a necessary 
precondition to exercising voice.225  And talking to coworkers who 
have already complained to the employer can lead a worker to see 
that she too “‘can speak up if something like this happens.’”226 
Coworkers’ experiences also allow them to provide informed 
guidance about possible rights’ violations.227  Obtaining such 
information is essential before complaining of discrimination because 
retaliation protection attaches only once the employee “reasonably 
believes” there has been a violation.228  Second, mutually supportive 
behavior that arises from coworker bonds sets the stage for collective 
action that helps to enforce antidiscrimination law.229  This is 
                                                                                                                 
Note that one sector of the sharing economy—the co-working firm—would provide 
workers with something like coworkers, even when workers are self-employed or 
labor for different firms. See Davidson & Infranca, supra note 6, at 15–16 (discussing 
the phenomena of co-working firms). 
 222. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Discrimination by Comparison, 120 YALE L.J. 728, 
750 (2011). 
 223. See Amy Blackstone et al., Legal Consciousness and Responses to Sexual 
Harassment, 43 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 631 (2009) (discussing the importance of legal 
consciousness to rights claiming). 
 224. Id. at 646 (collecting studies); see also Abhijeet K. Verdara et al., Making 
Sense of Whistle-Blowing’s Antecedents: Learning from Research on Identity and 
Ethics Programs, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 553 (2009) (workplace culture with higher 
incidence of coworker friendship is linked with a greater incidence of whistle-
blowing). 
 225. Blackstone et al., supra note 223, at 655–57 (explaining how relationships 
shape perceptions of having been wronged); Lilia M. Cortina & Vicki J. Magley, 
Raising Voice, Risking Retaliation: Events Following Interpersonal Mistreatment in 
the Workplace, 8 J. OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH PSYCHOL. 247, 249 (2003). 
 226. Cortina & Magley, supra note 225, at 249 (quoting research subject). 
 227. See Schoenbaum, supra note 221, at 621–25. 
 228. See supra notes 223–25 and accompanying text. 
 229. See supra Part I.B. 
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especially important given the role that the fear of retaliation plays in 
deterring workers from challenging discrimination.230  When a group 
of employees complain, it is harder for the employer to pin the blame 
on any individual worker, and the employer may be unwilling to 
terminate or otherwise retaliate against a large swath of workers. 
Third, strong coworker relationships obviate the need for 
complaint by preventing violations from occurring in the first place.  
Supportive work cultures with high coworker solidarity have been 
linked with lower incidences of sexual harassment.231 
The structural features that make many sharing-economy 
transactions more intimate will also limit the effectiveness of 
antidiscrimination law.  The lack of norms against the exercise of sex 
preferences in intimate settings will make any law that bans these 
preferences less likely to be enforced.  Because antidiscrimination law 
is largely enforced through private rights of action, the violation of 
norms will often be a necessary predicate to raising legal 
consciousness and taking legal action.232  And the fact that sharing-
economy transactions take place in a private setting with little 
monitoring not only makes the operation of antidiscrimination norms 
less effective, but also makes the operation of antidiscrimination law 
less effective.233  The decreased likelihood of detection lowers the 
expected cost of non-compliance, making non-compliance more 
likely.234  Scholars have posited that employers themselves can and do 
play a significant role in implementing antidiscrimination law.235  But 
firms will have a much harder time doing this in the case of 
disaggregated and private transactions of the sharing economy that 
take place without any workplace. 
4. New Directions 
While this Article does not take on the task of prescribing new 
approaches that could cure the legal shortcomings just discussed,236 a 
few words addressing possible future directions for law are in order.  
                                                                                                                 
 230. See Deborah Brake, Retaliation, 90 MINN. L. REV. 18, 20, 37 n.58 (2005) 
(compiling studies showing that “[f]ear of retaliation is the leading reason why people 
stay silent instead of voicing their concerns about bias and discrimination”). 
 231. See Blackstone et al., supra note 223, at 635 (collecting studies finding that the 
presence of coworker bonds is associated with lower incidence of discrimination). 
 232. See id. at 633–34. 
 233. See Strahilevitz, supra note 60, at 1759–65. 
 234. Id. 
 235. See Estlund, supra note 61, at 319; Sturm, supra note 61, at 460. 
 236. Future work will explore identity preferences and discrimination in the 
sharing economy and will have more to say on this. 
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First, regulating the information on which buyers and sellers can rely 
could successfully reduce discrimination while potentially better 
fulfilling preferences of buyers and sellers.  In the employment 
context, for example, limiting employers’ access to information about 
a prospective employee’s membership in a protected class is a key 
strategy the law relies on to reduce discrimination at the hiring 
stage.237 
One way to restrict discrimination in the sharing economy is to bar 
buyers and sellers from learning the sex of prospective transacting 
parties.  Banning access to such information may in fact lead to better 
fulfillment of the preferences of transacting parties, as they can no 
longer rely on sex as a proxy for the traits they seek, and must rely on 
other information that may prove to be more highly correlated with 
the traits they are seeking.  For example, if a buyer or seller is looking 
for a transacting party who will provide a more intimate transaction 
by sharing personal information, it will likely be more effective to 
seek a person with this trait rather than to rely on female sex as a 
proxy for this trait.  Self-disclosure or reviews by other users could 
reveal information about such traits.238  Prohibiting access to 
information about gender might be enough to spur sharing-economy 
firms to make available other information on which transacting 
parties could rely to satisfy their preferences.  If not, the law might 
come up with incentives for firms to do so. 
Another approach to addressing discrimination in the sharing 
economy would place a legal obligation on firms not to cultivate or 
reinforce discriminatory preferences of transacting parties.  Scholars 
have begun to explore proposals to this effect in other contexts in the 
traditional economy,239 and one could imagine that this type of 
                                                                                                                 
 237. See generally Naomi Schoenbaum, It’s Time That You Know: The 
Shortcomings of Ignorance as Fairness in Employment Law and the Need for an 
“Information-Shifting” Model, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 99 (2007).  Federal 
employment discrimination law treats employers’ preemployment inquiries regarding 
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state law prohibits such inquires. Id. at 137. 
 238. See Strahilevitz, supra note 60, at 1755–58, 1762, 1764–65 (proposing review 
system with commentary as a way to provide meaningful feedback in the context of 
driving, suggesting criteria for extension to other contexts, and giving the behavior of 
hotel guests as well as a number of online communities as examples).  These reviews 
themselves may be infected with bias, although the algorithm suggested below, see 
infra note 240 and accompanying text, could help to ameliorate this problem. 
 239. See Schoenbaum, supra note 10, at 1238–39 (arguing in the context of intimate 
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that cultivate and reinforce discriminatory preferences” of workers and customers); 
Bartlett & Gulati, supra note 213, at 36 (proposing the following law that would 
address customer discrimination: “any individual or entity with a legal obligation not 
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proposal could be extended to the sharing economy.  In fact, the 
technology on which sharing-economy firms rely would mitigate the 
burden of complying with such a mandate.  The fact that users select 
and review transacting parties online makes it easy for firms to 
monitor the behavior of their users through algorithms that would 
track whether users were disproportionately acting on sex (e.g., by 
rejecting or negatively reviewing transacting parties of one sex or the 
other).240  Although the tracking of user conduct by sharing-economy 
firms might raise privacy concerns,241 there does not seem to be a 
strong privacy interest in this non-intimate information,242 and the 
interest in rooting out discrimination would likely trump any interest 
in privacy. 
CONCLUSION 
New technologies can bring with them hope of transformative 
possibilities for the future.  And while innovations may contribute to 
significant progress, including for gender equality, we should be 
skeptical that technological progress inevitably leads to progress of 
other sorts.243  Nonetheless, the sharing economy may yet give us 
reason to be optimistic.  The pervasiveness of intimacy across the 
sharing economy could provide the motivation to spur innovative 
regulatory responses designed to combat discrimination in intimate 
spaces, which would be beneficial not only in the sharing economy, 
but across all intimate transactions. 
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